Rivista internazionale di scienze economiche e commerciali - Anno 42 N. 06 by unknown
JLSMN yJOjJ-blJ i 





Anno XLII Giugno 1995 N. 6 
Pubblicazione mensile - Sped, in abb. postale/50% - B o l o g n a f \ J Á'A*»-, VíNs. 
1 i. J 
S O M M A R I O 
Privatizations in the Western World (Le privatizzazioni nel mondo 
o c c i d e n t a l e ) R O B E R T H . W E S S E L P a g . 4 3 3 
The Adjustment Mechanism of Cournot and Pareto in the Monopo-
listic Competition Hypothesis (IL meccanismo di aggiustamento di 
Cournot e Pareto nell'ipotesi di concorrenza monopolistica) 
ALBERTO ZANNI 
Assets Valuation under Continuous Time: Some Remarks (La valu-
tazione delle attività in tempo continuo: alcune osservazioni) 
GIANLUCA CASSESE 
Habit Persistence, Measurement of Benefits, and the Determinants 
of Welfare Participation (Persistenza dell'abitudine, misure dei bene-
fici e determinanti della partecipazione all'assistenza sociale) 
Y u HSING 
A Note on Economic Rationality in Environmental Policy (Nota sul-
la razionalità economica nella politica ambientale) 
ALAIN V E R B E R E a n d CHRIS COECK 
A Note on Spatial Monopoly (Nota sul monopolio spaziale) 
LUCA LAMBERTINI 
Recensioni (Book-reviews) 
Libri ricevuti (Books Received) 









SOTTO GLI AUSPICI DELLA 
UNIVERSITÀ COMMERCIALE LUIGI BOCCONI 
E DELLA UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO 
ñ CEDAM 
COMITATO DI DIREZIONE - EDITORIAL BOARD 
HENRI BARTOLI (Université de Paris) - WILLIAM J. BAUMÖL (Princeton Univer-
sity) - GIOVANNI DEMARIA (Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei) - WILLIAM D. 
GRAMPP (Illinois University) - ARNALDO MAURI (Università di Milano) -
ARIBERTO MIGNOLI (Univers i tà B o c c o n i ) - ANTONIO MONTANER (Universi tät 
Mainz) - HISAO ONOE (Kyoto University) - ALBERTO QUADRIO CURZIO (Univer-
sità Cattolica, Milano) - ROBERTO RUOZI (Università Bocconi) - ROBERT M. 
SOLOW (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) - SERGIO STEVE (Università 
di R o m a ) - MARIO TALAMONA (Univers i tà di M i l a n o ) - SHIGETO TSURU 
(Hitotsubashi University) - BASIL S. YAMEY (London School of Economics 
and Political Science). 
DIRETTORE (EDITOR): ALDO MONTESANO (Università Bocconi ) 
Redazione (Editorial Office): ANNA BAGIOTTI CRAVERI 
DIRETTORE (EDITOR) dal 1 9 5 4 al 1 9 8 3 : TULLIO BAGIOTTI 
RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE E COMMERCIALI 
(INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS) 
Pubblicazione mensile (A monthly journal). Direzione e Redazione (Editorial Of-
fice): Via Teuliè 1, 20136 Milano (Italy), Tel. 02-58317434. 
Abbonamento 1995 (Subscription 1995): Italia (Italy), Lire 200.000; estero 
(abroad), Lire 300.000. Annate arretrate rilegate disponibili a prezzi speciali 
(Bound back volumes available at special prices). 
Per tutto ciò che riguarda l'AMMINISTRAZIONE, ci si rivolga unicamente alla 
CED AM - Casa Editrice Dott. Antonio Milani - Via Jappelli 5/6 - 35121 Padova 
(telefono 049/65.66.77 r.a. - fax 049/87.52.900 - Casella postale 1093 - Indirizzo 
telegrafico: Cedam, Padova - Conto corrente postale n. 205351 nell'ufficio dei 
conti di Venezia). 
CONDIZIONI DI ABBONAMENTO AI PERIODICI « CEDAM » 
L'abbonamento è annuo e si rinnova tacitamente per l'anno successivo se non viene 
disdetto entro il mese di dicembre, con lettera raccomandata. Il canone di abbonamento 
deve essere pagato anticipatamente. In caso di mancato pagamento la Casa non effettuerà 
l'invio dei fascicoli. I pagamenti possono essere effettuati direttamente alla Cedam 
di Padova sul c/c postale n. 205351 oppure ai suoi incaricati muniti di speciale 
delega, che rilasceranno ricevuta sui moduli recanti il marchio Cedam e numerati 
progressivamente. Il rinnovo dell'abbonamento deve essere effettuato entro il 30 aprile 
di ogni anno. Trascorso tale termine l'amministrazione provvederà direttamente all'incasso 
mediante emissione di fattura e sospenderà l'invio dei fascicoli nel caso di mancato 
pagamento. I fascicoli non pervenuti all'abbonato devono essere reclamati prima della 
conclusione dell'abbonamento in corso. Decorso tale termine saranno spediti, se 
disponibili, contro rimessa dell'importo. L'abbonamento comporta, agli effetti legali, 
elezione di domicilio in Padova presso la Casa Editrice Cedam. 
Direttore responsabile: Aldo Montesano - Autorizz. Tribunale di Treviso N. 113 del 22-10-54 
Rivista associata all'Unione della Stampa Periodica Italiana 
Tip. Leonelli - Villanova di Castenaso (Bo) 
Proprietà letteraria - Stampato in Italia - Printed in Italy 
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
Volume 42 (1995), N. 6, 433-452 
by 
R O B E R T H . W E S S E L 
PRIVATIZATIONS IN T H E WESTERN W< 
While most of the countries of the formerly Communist areas have 
been making structural changes to rid themselves of the heritage of gov-
ernment ownership and operation of productive facilities, substantial but 
more limited programs of economic reform have been undertaken by the 
nations of the Western world. These programs have emphasized policies of 
liberalization and privatization. Although not as dramatic as the changes in 
Communist areas, they have been widespread in both the geographic distri-
bution and long run implications. 
Liberalization of course refers to enhancing freedom in both resource 
allocation and decision making. Privatization in simple terms means the 
transfer of productive facilities from government to private hands. Usually 
both control and ownership are involved though in some instances only 
management is changed. In the West, privatizations have been much less 
radical than in the formerly Communist countries, where a restructuring of 
the whole society was usually attempted. Although privatizations in the 
breakup of Communism have largely been a phenomenon of the 1990's, in 
the West they have been taking place on a limited scale for decades. For 
example, Volkswagen was privatized in 1961, the sale of Veba A5 began in 
1965 and the British Petroleum sell off was started in 1977. Some smaller 
firms were privatized long before. 
Goals of Privatization 
The objectives of privatization in Western nations have been many and 
diverse. In their study of this phenomenon through the public sale of shares, 
Meggison, Nash and Randenborgh use a simple two-fold classification 
* University of Cincinnati, Department of Economics, Cincinnati, OH (U.S.A.). 
434 ROBERT H. WESSEL 
asking only "whether the governments involved were pursuing principally 
political or financial objectives" (Meggison et al., 1994). This may be 
satisfactory for some as a first approximation. However, many essentially 
different motives are in fact frequently included under both "political" and 
"financial" so that an expanded treatment is required. The following classifi-
cation of goals in a Western setting seems appropriate. 
1. Shrink the State. — When this is the primary goal, a broad scale restructur-
ing similar to but not as extensive as those undertaken by the formerly 
Communistic states is attempted. An improvement in both the macro and 
micro efficiency of the economy is sought. The situation they seek to correct 
in the Western world, however, is by no means as severe. Britain in the 
1970's, for example, was far less socialized than the Soviet bock in 1990 
and its economy still was largely controlled by market forces. 
2. Increase the Efficiency of Industrial Firms. — In the simple case, firms are 
transferred to private hands in order to improve their operation. Most 
privatizations have this as one of their objectives. The process may simply 
involve installing new management and new techniques of operation. After 
the late 1970's on the other hand, when British Steel recorded the largest 
loss ever sustained by a U.K. company, it was finally privatized in 1988 to 
facilitate drastic reorganization which they hoped would staunch such losses. 
British Steel now is the only profitable steel maker in Europe. The new 
ownership enabled it to absorb the enormous human and financial cost of 
the transition to profitability. An 85 percent contraction of its workforce, a 
220,000 job loss, and the closing of 33 of its 37 facilities were involved 
(Millbank, 1993). 
Modern methods may have to be brought in by the new owners of a 
firm going private, frequently from abroad. Needed new capital may also 
be imported or obtained because the privatized firm has access to wider 
capital markets. 
3. Labor Cost Savings. — Although the power of organized labor has been on 
the wane in most western countries, the public sector has been a notable 
exception. Because of lack of competition, public managers have been much 
less aggressive in collective bargaining negotiations. As a result, operating 
rules are often much more restrictive and wages unduly inflated. Privatiza-
tion which either terminates the collective bargaining process or make it 
much more efficient can change this situation. This motive for privatization 
has been increasingly important recently in U.S. cities. It is not surprising 
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that unions are usually the strongest opponents of the contracting for public 
services by private firms. 
4. The Financial Motive. — Many governments have undertaken privatiza-
tions because of the substantial revenue they produce. The Meggison study 
drawing on data from 28 countries over the 32-year period from 1961 to 
1993, showed that 139 issues by 110 companies raised $222 billion. In 
Britain alone, proceeds from privatizations came to over $79 billion. The 
use of these funds has varied. In the British case, a 54 percent reduction in 
public debt from 124 percent of GDP in 1970 to 60 percent in 1989 
resulted (Feidler, 1991). Many countries such as Argentina have relied on 
privatizations to help meet current operating budgets. In some cases, they 
also seek to get loss ridden enterprises off the public books. The exact 
extent of the use of privatizations for budgetary reasons cannot be accurate-
ly measured since most sell-offs produce structural as well as financial 
results and both types of outcomes may be among those sought. The extent 
to which the revenues from those sales are budgeted or otherwise incorpo-
rated into government plans leads many observers to conclude that thlis is 
possibly the primary reason why privatizations occur. South Africa's inten-
tions to sell off public property a few months after the ANC took over 
surely reinforces this view. 
The massive privatizations in Latin America during the early 1990's 
point up possible pitfalls of primarily seeking budgetary gains. In many 
cases, the possible proceeds from sales are overestimated by financially 
plagued bureaucrats. They also too often ignore the fact that a property can 
only be sold once and that after the sale process is complete that source of 
financing is gone. At best privatizations bring only short-term budgetary 
relief. Relying on this source of funds can prove very short-sighted as a 
long-range policy, especially for mature countries which have relatively easy 
access to capital markets. Unhappily the firms frequently selected to raise 
quick cash are often well operated, usually in monopoly settings, and are 
least in need of an ownership change. Basket cases, which need drastic 
reforms, rarely bring substantial prices. { 
5. Political Motives in Privatizations. - In many recent privatizations, shares 
have been underpriced by as much as 25 percent and as a result these issues 
usually are substantially oversubscribed. Obviously, buyers benefit from be-
ing allowed in the market. In more extreme cases, much larger discounts are 
offered usually to strategic members of the population to insure their 
support. For example, in Argentina in its public sale of YPF-S.A., the oil 
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and gas company, 13 percent of the shares were exchangeable for gov-
ernment bonds issued free to pensioners. Their enthusiastic backing was 
inevitable. In Russia, to obtain widespread public ownership, vouchers ex-
changeable for shares in industry were distributed at no cost to all members 
of the population. Free or low price shares are also often offered to em-
ployees and management groups in the privatized firms. It is important to 
distinguish two somewhat different motives for such acts. The policy of 
making important groups beneficiaries of a privatization may be intended to 
enlist their support for the entire privatization process. This should not be 
confused with merely passing out favors to build goodwill for the gov-
ernment or its leaders. The importance of strong public support may be 
critical where a series of sales are part of an overall program of structural 
change or efficiency enhancement. It is essential in these cases that support 
continue throughout the whole series of offerings. A break-down or lo,ss of 
confidence when the program is only partially completed might largely 
frustrate the entire venture. When the sale involves only a single company 
such as the public offering of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone in f987, 
the need for support may be limited to a few financial institutions and 
i does not extend to the community at large. 
We should emphasize before leaving the topic of motivation that two 
or more goals are commonly sought. In most sales in the West, ' only 
greater efficiency of operation and financial rewards have been expected. 
Broader political objectives are only the rule where more drastic reform is 
undertaken. ! 
Techniques of Privatization 
Several approaches have enjoyed wide popularity. The public sale of 
stock is almost mandatory when very large individual properties are sold. 
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone brought $15 billion, $40 billion and $20 
billion in successive sales in 1987 and 1988. British Petroleum last sale was 
for $14 billion in 1987, British Telecommunication raised $22 billion from 
1984 to 1991, and Telefonas de Mexico $2 billion in 1991. Billion dollar 
sales with public stock offerings were frequent with distributions of this 
type. When less than $100 million was involved they were somewhat 
unusual. The mean value of 130 such sales from 1961 through 1993 was 
$1.6 billion and the median $560 million. ¡ 
Trade sales usually to a single or a few buyers are frequently em-
ployed, especially where price is important. In most cases there is a single 
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buyer, typically foreign, but in the same industry who can supply both 
capital and management (Privatization Yearbook, 1993). The sale of Ba-
namex of Mexico in 1991 and the ill-fated sale of Aerolíneas Argentinas 
to Iberia are examples. ; 
Restrictions in relation to ownership may be imposed, usually limiting 
the percentage of shares which may be foreign held. Golden shares are 
sometimes issued to the government which enables it to retain a degree of 
control, in most cases a veto power. Some firms are restructured before they 
are sold to enhance their values. When the government for political reasons 
cannot wait for restructuring, the privatization may be accomplished using 
mutual funds which usually arouse less public opposition. This type of 
measure is not typical of Western privatizations and is almost always found 
in formerly Communist nations. Small firms are almost always sold to single 
buyers. 
Who Has Privatized? 
We know with reasonable accuracy which countries have launched 
privatizations. Although it would be impossible to list all of the individual 
privatizations in a short article, we have a fairly accurate picture of the 
properties transferred to private hands. Apart from competitive market 
sales, the worth of these properties is highly conjectural. Some are sold at 
what seems to be close to their full value, others at varying discounts and 
still others are given away. Since public records are by no means accurate or 
available, it also remains difficult to determine the total amount raised from 
the sales which we know have occurred or where sales have been at a 
discount below the total value that has changed hands. One component, the 
amounts obtained from the public sale of stock can be reasonably estimated, 
however. The Meggison study is a fertile source of information on the 139 
transactions involving 110 companies. Here $222 billion was raised over 
the years from 1961 to 1993 (Meggison et al., 1994, p. 4). The total sums 
raised by private sales, both large and small, are not easily determinable and 
are difficult to approximate because information on both the transactions 
and revenues may not be in the public domain. Estimates of the total 
proceeds of privatization in the Western World in recent years have ranged 
from $126 billion to $328 billion. Unhappily, the figures are not directly 
comparable. Time periods differ. The $126 billion estimate was from 1988 
through 1992, the $328 billion from 1985 on. Sources such as OECD, 
the E.I.U., Morgan Stanley and Privatization International were used in 
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these estimates. Other relied on many different ones. There is variation in 
selection of items to be included as proceeds of privatization. Opinion also 
differs as to which exchange rate should be used in currency valuations. 
Even if the estimates could be standardized for all of these variables, very 
large differences would remain. It is, however, likely that all estimates 
understate the actual amount by a substantial margin due to large gaps in all 
of the data. 
What Has Been Privatized? 
When the economies of the former Soviet world are taken private 
firms of all types are involved. Small retailers as well as every type of 
industrial giant can be included. All have been public property and are 
subject to transfer to private hands. In the countries of the Western World, 
the choice is much more limited. It should be apparent that only firms that 
are government owned or managed are subject to this step. This eliminates 
almost all retail establishments and small shops. Most small competitive 
manufacturing firms are also excluded for this reason. Of those privatized, 
telecommunication companies have produced the most revenue. Candidates 
are usually in the monopoly or public utility sector. Almost half of the 
money value has been derived from the public sale of stock issues. The 
largest single company ever privatized, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, 
was a member of this group. Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark success-
fully privatized their telephone companies through stock issues. Today, 
around 30 telecom firms in the Asian Pacific region are listed on local stock 
exchanges. In Britain, water and electric companies have also accounted for 
a significant part of the money take. Banks which have been publicly owned 
are frequently privatized, particularly in France and Italy. Airlines have 
begun as public ventures and then put up for sale. Among the industrial 
group petroleum companies have most often been publicly owned and then 
taken private. British Petroleum is a well-known example. Steel and other 
basic industries have also often been nationalized in the past and are now 
being privatized as more countries seek to desocialize their economies (Mor-
gan Stanley, 1993). 
Do Privatizations Increase Efficiency? 
It is obvious that privatizations usually meet the financial goal of 
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producing very substantial revenue. Their influence upon operating efficien-
cy is more difficult to ascertain. In Britain where data on privatized firms 
and their public counterparts have been available for almost two decades, 
the nature of the relationship is not totally clear. Profit margins have grown 
and employment has declined in both privatized and publicly owned firms. 
This might suggest that growth and profitability have made privatizations 
acceptable rather than being caused by it (Bishop and Kay, 1989). On the 
other hand, proponents of private ownership contend that the competition 
of privatized firms has forced improved methods on publicly owned facili-
ties as well. In the cases of British Coal and British Steel, the productivity 
gains have been very large (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). On the other hand, 
water rates to British consumers have increased 67 percent since the state-
owned water utility was broken up into eleven private regional water compa-
nies a few years ago. A recent World Bank study of 12 privatizations in 
Britain, Malaysia, Mexico and Chile, however, indicates a high incidence of 
success. In 11 of these cases, there were substantial productivity gains 
especially in countries that stress both efficiency and competition. ! 
Privatizations often lead to substantial capital infusions into once dor-
mant industries. In Argentina, the new owners of two newly privatized 
telephone companies invested almost $3 billion in new equipment. As a 
result, direct international dialing is now possible. Gas and electric compa-
nies there have also invested sufficient funds so that the higher demand of 
summer months can be met. In addition, gas supplies there in winter are 
now reliable (.Economist, January 8, 1994). Argentina's experience shows 
that not all privatizations work out well especially those poorly planned and 
hastily undertaken. The sale of Aerolinas Argentinas to Spain's Iberia 
resulted in many complaints of poor service and continuing losses. Ultimately 
a partial renationalization of 30 percent of its shares took place. Since most 
privatizations have occurred in the last six years, a final reading on efficien-
cy gains has yet to be taken. Most preliminary indications however, are good 
and individual case results are indeed promising. 
Privatizations in Future Years 
It is impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy the volume of 
future sales of public firms. Changes in political currents make even the most 
well-prepared privatizations subject to delay, changes or even cancellations. 
The extent of this type of activity is, however, a matter of great importance 
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and interest. The following survey is intended to provide an overview of the 
extent of possible ventures in this area. It is necessarily drawn from current 
sources and therefore lacks the refinement of lengthy evaluation and de-
tailed scrutiny. It does, however, provide meaningful insights as to where 
the process is probably going and new developments that can be expected. 
* 
* * 
Britain. — Under the Thatcher government, Britain became both a leader and 
early player in the privatization game. Since 1980, over $75 billion have 
been raised in this way leaving relatively little property available for sale. 
What remains includes National Power, which has already privatized its 
generators, British Coal, British Rail and the Post Office. 
The sale of British Coal now seems likely but its scale of opera-
tion is sure to be drastically reduced. A decade ago, it produced 90 
million metric tons at its 65 mines using 191,500 workers. Now output is 
60 million ton in only 49 mines with a mere 8000 workers. Some mines 
have reopened under new ownership. Some small private sector companies 
have improved operations and earned profits where large government-
owned enterprises could not. They use about half as many workers as 
British Coal but have achieved a much higher level of productivity. Work 
shifts are longer and unions have backed down on many restrictive work 
rules. This may be a road to the future. British Coal's properties will 
probably be sold in pieces rather than to a single buyer (Millbank, 1994). 
The estimated value of all of its businesses is £700 to £800, $1.1 billion to 
$1.3 billion. 
When parliament passed the Railways Acts, it contemplated separate 
sales of passenger franchises and infrastructure. This plan has been set aside 
because of labor difficulties. Total railroad assets are valued at £4 to £6 
billion, $6 to $10 billion. Although some members of the government 
wanted speedy action, the complex nature of the entire process caused them 
to proceed cautiously with privatizing rail service (Economist, August 21, 
1993). Public reaction to the enormous profitability of privatized public 
utilities has often been quite adverse. Between 1990 and 1994, profits for 
regional electric companies more than doubled and at some water companies, 
they quadrupled. Executive pay has soared. This may not be tolerated. 
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Some movement toward privatizing Britain's prison system is also tak-
ing place. The prison education system already has been sold. Large sums, 
however, are not involved in the whole venture. In summary, some move-
ment toward privatization in Britain is still alive. The maximum proceeds 
though are at best $5 to $10 billion dollars. When such sums are likely to 
be forthcoming is very uncertain. Changing the industrial structure in the 
direction of private operation produced significant costs for Britain. Its 
share of world trade has dropped to 8 percent from 9.7 percent ten years 
ago. Since the end of the 1970's, 5.5. million manufacturing jobs have been 
lost and those unemployed have not found replacements at comparable pay. 
France. - From 1986 to 1988, the conservative administration of Edmond 
Balladur had conducted an aggressive privatization program selling off such 
firms as Saint Gobain, Banque Paribas, Compagnie Générale d'Electricité, 
Société Générale and Compagnie Financière de Suez. Total sales came 
to $24 billion with public stock sales alone amounting to over $15 billion. 
This process ended with the election of a socialist government. Renationali-
zation did not occur, however. The return of the Balladur group to power 
led to the passage of a bill in June 1993 mandating the privatization of 21 
of the largest government-owned firms with a planned revenue to the state 
of about $68 billion. In October of that year, 60 percent of Banque Na-
tionale de Paris was sold for $4.9 billion. Rhône-Poulenc, France's largest 
pharmaceutical and chemical company, which itself has invested over $8 
billion in the U.S., was placed on sale in November. At that time, 43 percent 
of Rhône-Poulenc stock had been directly government owned with another 
18 percent held by state-owned banks. The company is both profitable and 
efficient. It is interesting to note that officials of these companies are often 
anxious to be privatized primarily to obtain access to broader capital 
markets. In January 1994, 88.5 million shares of Elf Aquitaine were placed 
on the market for $6 billion dollars ( Wall Street journal News Roundup, 
January 21, 1994). 
Any action with Air France seems years away. The government in 
1994 invested another large sum in the carrier which still needs drastic 
reorganization before it can be marketed. With Renault, things were very 
different. The company has been profitable and well regarded. In November 
1994, the government announced the successful sale of 29 percent of the 
shares of the auto maker. Over one million investors paid 165 francs a 
share, a total of 8.6 billion francs, or $1.61 billion for this stake (Truell, 
1994). Further sales were expected after France's 1995 presidential elec-
tions. But in a surprise move, less than two weeks after the 29 percent block 
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sale, the government announced that Renault will be fully privatized in the 
second half of 1995. The reason seems to be the creditability of the budget 
which calls for 55 billion francs from privatizations. Sale of the remaining 
Renault stake could raise 20 billion of that total. 
With Machines Bull, the situation was improving so that action on 
privatization became possible in early 1995. Although the large computer 
maker, which is 75.6 percent owned by the state, had experienced recent 
heavy losses, in 1995 it expected to show a small profit. As a result, in late 
March 1995, the French government began its privatization, pricing Bull 
quite moderately. As a result, Motorola is buying 10 percent and NEC of 
Japan, 17 percent. Assurances that Bull will not be broken up by purchasers 
were expected by the government. The company has been cutting both its 
debt and its payroll to improve operations (Lavin, 1995). 
Misguided industrial policies by the state have been the cause of basic 
planning errors at both Bull and Air France. Even successful firms such as 
Elf have had loss making policies forced on them to implement French 
foreign policy or other government's objectives. Although professional merit 
has dominated most appointments, political parties of all hues have usually 
replaced managements of state-owned enterprises after elections. There are 
indications they intend to continue this practice after privatization, especial-
ly where state enterprises will remain large shareholders of privatization 
firms (Economist, January 22, 1993). 
Pechiney SA, the French aluminum and packaging giant is a firm the 
government eventually hopes to privatize. The company which was national-
ized by the Socialists in 1982 needs a major overhaul before that step is 
practical. Costs should be lowered and its debt which now exceeds equity 
must be reduced. In April 1995, the company announced a two-year strate-
gy to focus on its core business. This would involve sell-offs of its com-
ponent and system departments, turbine operations and its glass business. It 
would still retain its U.S. subsidiary, American National Can, which it 
acquired in 1988 and is its major source of international revenue {Wall 
Street Journal, April 12, 1995). 
In general, the privatization program has been going well. By the end 
of 1994, France had realized almost 70 billion francs through asset sales, 
thus passing the pre-established goal of 55 billion. In February 1995, the 
government suspended all privatizations until after the election in May of 
that year. Had Mr. Balladur succeeded Mr. Mitterand as president, the 
quick privatization of steel maker Usinor-Sacilor and Assurances Générales 
de France could have been expected (New York Times, 1994). Since that 
did not take place, the outcome is less clear. One can only conjecture if at 
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some future date the fortunes of loss ridden Crédit Lyonnais will improve 
to the point where it too can enter into the privatization process. 
Italy. - Past privatizations in Italy have been few in numbers and produced 
relatively little revenue. The sale of part of Società Finanziaria Telefonica in 
June 1992 produced $590 million, a very large sum by Italian standards/An 
urgent need for cash, EC demands for less political meddling in industry, 
plus a rapidly changing domestic situation following revelations of massive 
corruption at all levels of government produced plans for a sell off second 
only to that of France. 
Italy's banks have been antiquated for years and unable to revitalize 
their own operations. Several privatizations and takeover attempts may be 
signaling a change. Credito Italiano, Italy's eighth largest bank with 122 
trillion lire in assets, was privatized in December 1993. In March 1994, 
Banca Commerciale Italiana (BCI) also took this route and relinquished 
public ownership. Since then, these banks have been attempting to take Over 
several other banks, Credito Romagnolo and Banco Ambroveneto, in particu-
lar They themselves, however, have come under the control of Enrico 
Cuccia of Mediobanca. At the same time, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Italy's 
fourth largest bank and that city's principle source of income, was contem-
plating conversion into a joint stock company (Economist, November 5 
1994). 
Mediobanca also hopes to play a leading role in the privatization of 
Stet (Società Finanziaria Telefonica), the state controlled telecommunica-
tions company, only part of which was privatized in 1992. It plans to pay 
cash and then distribute the shares to a group of core investors who are 
allies of Mr. Cuccia. Other interests had hoped that international investment 
banking channels such as Morgan Stanley or Goldman Sachs would handle 
the issue which could then have been actively traded on the stock market 
(Kline, 1995). 
Alberto Clo, Minister of Industry, wants Enel, the state power utility, 
to be a single vertically integrated monopoly when it is privatized in July 
1995. Italy's Autorità Garante, the antitrust watch dog, however, favors 
breaking it up so as to foster competition. The Autorità, nevertheless, can 
only give advice and warnings on matters pertaining to electricity. The 
outcome is not clear (.Economist, April 8, 1995). 
Privatization seems to be making significant progress in Italy. Obvious-
ly, important segments of the economy that only a short time ago were in 
1 In late 1994, Credito Italiano agreed to acquire 65% of Credito Romagnolo for 2.8 trillion 
lire ($1.73 billion) or 20,000 lire a share. 
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government hands are now private. The meaning of this, however, is not 
entirely clear. The roles of old powerful families or of individuals such as 
Mr. Cuccia makes the usual interpretations difficult. The existence of an 
interim government with Prime Minister Lamberto Dini makes explanations 
even more hazardous. 
The future of the entire privatization plan also is still somewhat in 
doubt because of the exceedingly unstable political climate the corruption 
scandal has created. However, the financial needs of government are enor-
mous which almost dictates further privatization. In addition to creating 
new jobs, further deregulation of the private sector must also occur. If the 
privatization program announced almost two years ago is completed as 
planned, some $60 billion or more could be realized. It would be a mistake 
to leave this topic without mentioning the widespread zeal that privatization 
and free markets have aroused on the part of the Italian public and, the 
resulting pressure on political groups. 
Germany. — When East Germany merged with the West an agency, Treu-
handanstalt, was established to privatize state-owned enterprises. Its purpose, 
unlike most other privatization agencies in Western Europe, was not to 
produce revenue for government but to rehabilitate the East German econo-
my. Treuhand sales will probably in total generate losses of over DM 270 
billion ($150 billion). Although these losses were vastly larger than ex-
pected, Treuhand did accomplish its primary objectives. It sold off all but 
100 of the 12370 businesses on its books in 1990 and left an East German 
economy that grew 9 percent in 1994. The human costs were high, 
however, with six million of the ten million jobs in these industries being 
eliminated. Of the few companies still on the books, most will probably be 
liquidated (Kaminsky, 1993). One of the last Eastern German firms to be 
sold will be Deutsche Waggonbau A.G., a railroad with about 6000 em-
ployees. Advent International Corporation, a U.S. firm, has expressed in-
terest. Since West Germany like the U.S. has largely relied on private 
enterprises, fewer opportunities for privatization have presented themselves 
outside of East Germany. Now, however, a new examination of the public 
utility field is taking place. An accord reached in January 1994 will allow 
the selling off of part of the shares of Deutsche Bundespost Telekom begin-
ning in early 1996. This could open voice service in Germany to competi-
tive markets. But Telekom has been offering very generous benefits to 
employees. Competitive exposure could end all this. As a result, a substan-
tial interest exists in continuing its protected status. Its value in privatiza-
tion would also be enhanced (Hudson, 1994). The part of the company 
PRIVATIZATIONS IN THE WESTERN WORLD 445' 
providing postal service and telephone-line networking would remain 
public. The management has been pushing for privatization as a way to 
access capital markets as well as to modernize and improve service. 
Government may keep a share to influence important decisions. This 
company has been valued at from $45 to $64 billion and could bring as 
much as $65 billion in sales over five years. It is not surprising that they 
have brought together three leading investment bankers, including Goldman 
Sachs, to handle the distribution. 
A large number of enterprises which could be operated by private 
companies are still run by the state. This stems largely from a reluctance of 
local governments to give up their influence or the right to name important 
executives. In late 1994, an effort to facilitate privatization was blocked by 
the Bundesrat. The federal government has a much better record reducing its 
holdings from 968 firms in 1982 to under 400 in 1995. It recently sold part 
of Leythania and plans to complete the sale in 1995. The German monopo-
lies commission estimates that over DM 100 billion could be raised by 
privatization on a large scale (Viewpoint, December 1994). 
Treuhand has invested over $300 million in EKO Stahl Gmbh and 
guaranteed another $100 million in loans to cover losses. It has also offered 
Cockerill Sambe S.A. $610 million in subsidies on condition it upgrades 
the plant and keeps 2,000 of the original 12,000 jobs. As a result, it has 
lured private investors into the troubled region and given a last chance to 
many industries. This is very expensive privatization but it may be paying 
off (Gumbel, 1994). 
Sweden. - This country in late 1980 undertook a program of a relative 
magnitude rivaling Margaret Thatcher's. Sales of steel mills, mines, energy 
and forestry companies privatized firms with 300,000 employees and sales 
of $40 billion in private assets. Involved too were the beginnings of the 
marketing of Procordia, the drug giant. A partial sale of this company 
brought in $3.8 billion in 1989. Completion of the sale of Procordia as well 
as several other projects now underway could produce over $10 billión by 
1998. In the summer of 1994, Sweden was successful in selling a large 
stake in Pharmacia, the drug maker. Institutional investors eagerly bóught 
24.5 million Class A shares while households purchased 47.5 million shares 
at a discount (Moore, 1994). 
Spain. - Spain has sold off part of Argentana a large bank, and plans to 
market Endera, the electric utility; Telefonica, the telecom utility; add oil 
company, Repsol. This could total over $8 billion. The pace of privatisation 
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has been retarded by the Socialist government which is still in place. A 
conservative victory in the 1993 elections would have accelerated the 
process. 
Latin America. — This area produced 35 percent of the privatizations world-
wide in 1992. It did so in a desperate search for funds. In addition, 
privatizations were successful before the recent problems in luring, back 
much of the foreign and local capital that had gone overseas. Mexico also 
engaged in a $20 billion property sell-off between 1988 and 1992 which 
contributed to this return of funds before the financial crisis. Other coun-
tries also have active programs. Argentina's YPF, only two years after its 
own privatization, hopes to be a front line bidder at oil and gas privatiza-
tions in Bolivia and Peru. Peru expects to raise over $9 billion over the next 
few years in this way. Its dominant cement maker, Cementos Lima S.A. is 
prepared to invest in a hydroelectric plant soon to be privatized (Moffett, 
1995). Brazil, though it started late, has thus far raised over $7 billion in 
cash and has been relieved of $3 billion of debt from the sale of state assets. 
It planned to sell 32 more companies in the first phase of a new privatiza-
tion program beginning in 1994. Thereafter, it anticipates another $20 
billion from the sale of mining interests, as well as telephone and petroleum 
companies, making the grand total some $40 billion. Most of these funds 
are needed for domestic investments. Before all of these are realized, consti-
tutional barriers to the sale of many properties must be removed. Privatiza-
tion hopes in Brazil took a step backward when President Fernando Henri-
que Cardoso failed to act on Telebras, the telephone company (Ellison, 
1995). 
Even Bolivia is getting into the act. They expect $2 billion to be 
provided from this source for much needed capital investment. First to be 
sold is Entel, the state-owned phone company, followed by electric utility, 
Ende. Railroads oil companies, airlines, smelting facilities and prefectural 
hotels will follow. Bolivia, avoiding the term privatization, will "capitalize" 
six strategic companies by giving control to private investors on the condi-
tion that they invest a predetermined amount in each company (Hendir, 
1993). 
Columbia plans to privatize long distance telephone service, three 
banks, eight electric plants and other state-owned properties by 1999. They 
expect to raise at least $3.5 billion in this way, according to Finance Min-
ister Guillermo Perry. 
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Privatizing Social Insurance 
Chile had privatized most of its publicly held firms a year ago. Like 
many other countries with social security systems and declining birthrates, 
Chile faced the problem of fewer and fewer contributors supporting a 
growing group of retirees. Its answer was to privatize the social insurance 
system. This also helped reduce a national budget where one-fifth of the 
funds were allocated to pension and health insurance costs. The operation of 
the systems is unique. Here 10 percent of the worker's pay goes to a private 
fund of the workers choosing which then invests in a portfolio of securities. 
Over the first decade of operation, these funds have averaged 14 percent on 
the workers' investments, a return which encourages even broader participa-
tion. The government oversees but cannot appropriate these funds and 
guarantees a minimum pension should returns from a fund fall below sub-
sistence levels. The real extent of this obligation will not be known until 
large numbers of employees reach retirement age a generation or so in the 
future. The total amount in these funds now amounts to $19.22 billion or 
about 35 percent of Chile's GDP. 
By 1994 Mexico, Peru, Colombia and Argentina had adopted forms of 
this privatized system. Colombia, however, has compromised by retaining 
one fund in government hands, as an example to private funds in the 
control of costs (Moffet, 1994). 
The success of this approach depends upon whether the returns the 
funds can generate over the years are high enough so that both state budgets 
and pensions income will benefit. If not, a liability will fall upon the gov-
ernment, but possibly no more than under Western governments social 
insurance systems. Although not totally applicable to large nations, this 
approach might be advantageously used with part of their social insurance 
funds. 
Argentina has long been pursuing privatization as a source of financ-
ing. On September 1, 1994, it announced its total conversion to this 
approach by stating its intention to sell off all state-owned and operated 
enterprises. They will begin with three nuclear power plants. Its largest 
petrochemical group will be next followed by the postal service and the 
nation's principal airports (Hamilton, 1994). 
The United States 
Very litde public ownership of industry has existed in the United 
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States. Public operation has largely been confined to local service industries 
and infrastructure firms where at least reasonable public satisfaction has 
been encountered with the service rendered. Only one national privatiza-
tion, Conrad, has taken place. There the entity created out of six failed 
railroads was taken private eleven years later. Government takeovers have 
occurred largely because private operators have been unable to supply the 
service or product at acceptable prices. No wide support has ever been 
registered for socialist projects either at the local or national level. Obvious-
ly, no Communist regimes have been established. The few occasions where 
socialist candidates have achieved some success (Burlington, Vermont, is a 
case in point) have not resulted in widespread public ownership. As a result, 
no significant privatization movement sprung up for a long time since public 
operation was so limited. It is, therefore, not surprising that the public 
sector in many areas became bloated and inefficient after years of public 
complacency, especially when compared to some nations with active privati-
zation programs. Interest was aroused as the result of a public reawakening 
to the possibility of substantial savings along with the aggressive posturing 
of public employee unions. Although organized labor has not done well 
recently in most sectors of the American economy, in public employment it 
has been enjoying increased membership and recognition along with less 
than vigorous resistance in collective bargaining by local officials. This has 
often led to inflated pay scales and efficiency inhibiting work rules. A 
growing interest in privatization has sprung up, especially in communities 
with significant budget difficulties. In addition, in April 1992, the Bush 
administration took steps to permit local governments to realize important 
economies from privatization (Reason Foundation, 1993). 
In the United States, it is unlikely that any of the few massive publicly-
owned facilities will be sold to private owners. Consequently, the vast 
revenues such sales might produce will not be a temptation to government. 
Privatization in the U.S. has usually meant contracting with the private 
sector to deliver services historically provided directly by government. Pri-
vate operation has been expected to bring improved management of more 
motivated employees. Great success has been achieved in solid waste collec-
tion and disposal. The privatized industries' output here could total $30 
billion in value in a few years. Waterworks operation and management on a 
private basis could also approach that figure. Frequently, the gain from 
private operation can be realized by contracting for only a part of the 
needed services and allowing competition between the public and private 
providers to generate the efficiency advances. In Indianapolis where only a 
small section of the city street maintenance was privatized, the competitive 
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process did the rest. Newark now spends $1 in contract services for every 
$2 in house. Street sweeping proved a case where outstanding results were 
realized through competition. This was also true in Boston (Sharp, 1992). 
Sussex, New Jersey, has had success with security guards used in this way. 
Portland, Oregon; Tacoma, Washington; and Baltimore, Maryland, have 
similar public and private programs in the same area. 
In October 1993, Rodney E. Slater proposed that private businesses 
operate part of the interstate highway system and charge tolls for its uses. 
Only in this way did he feel that funds could be raised to repair decaying 
highways and bridges (Tolchin, 1993). When he became mayor of New 
York, Rudolph Giuliani indicated that he would seek to improve services 
and shrink government through privatization. The initial move is expected 
to be the transfer of at least three of the city's 11 municipal hospitals to 
private nonprofit corporations. Mayor Giuliani also sought bids on the 
Offtrack Betting Corporation which he calls "the only bookie in New York 
who loses money". Proposals are being considered to privatize the city's 
Emergency Medical Service, the bus service, garbage collection and the 
water supply system. A $16 billion saving over the next ten years can, 
according to some experts, be expected from this source. Giuliani's 
predecessor, David D. Dinkins, had taken some small steps in this direction 
by having contractors manage centers for the elderly as well as boiler inspec-
tions. Giuliani can, however, expect strong opposition from municipal 
unions whose members stand to lose jobs in the process (Myers, 1994). 
Many other cities including Los Angeles, Chicago, whose mayor calls 
for privatizing the schools, and Philadelphia, are considering similar steps. 
How far this movement will go is at this point conjectural. To an extent, 
this will depend on the outcome of the battle between the municipalities 
and their employee unions. The saving, however, might be measured in the 
hundreds of billions of dollars (Reason Foundation, 1993). 
Conclusion 
We must remember that all these projections are tempered by the 
mood of the times. Recently public ownership and operation have been in 
great disfavor while privatizations have enjoyed widespread support. Even 
some so-called socialist parties in countries such as France now partially 
endorse this approach. The Reáson Foundation's head, Robert Poole, has 
urged the sale of all types of publicly owned properties from bridges to the 
TVA. It is indeed possible that under these conditions privatizations will be 
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overdone or inappropriately applied and that much of the current enthu-
siasm will dissipate. This is especially true since privatizations are being 
suggested and in some cases undertaken in areas where they have the least 
to contribute. While hard evidence suggests that success is most likely 
where private ownership and operation are employed in vigorously competi-
tive markets, many of the new ventures are in the monopoly or public utility 
field. True, better methods, improved technology and new capital infusions 
as well as pay scales related to productivity may produce successes even in 
these areas. The chance of failure, however, here is inevitably greater. 
Another danger arises when governments are unwilling to give up control of 
partially privatized firms. For example, Belgium's enterprise minister has 
asserted that "the state will always have the final say at Belgacom", that 
country's telephone company. As a result of this type of interference, either 
much needed reforms do not take place or are delayed excessively 
We must also remember that all too frequently privatizations are under-
taken as a quick source of badly needed public funds. Those which are 
hastily conceived and inadequately planned have a significant chance of 
failure. 
Very few privatizations, however successful, are totally free of adverse 
consequences. Many leave substantial unemployment in their wake. Britain, 
it will be remembered, lost 5.5 million manufacturing jobs as a consequence 
of its program. Under these circumstances, governments should consider 
investing part of the proceeds of privatization in job retraining to improve 
the chances of comparably paid reemployment. Other undesirable results 
should, if possible, be offset by compensatory actions. This could enhance 
the social net gain by avoiding leaving devasted populations or areas as 
unhappy by product of progress. 
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LE PRIVATIZZAZIONI NEL MONDO OCCIDENTALE 
La maggior parte delle privatizzazioni nel mondo occidentale sono state rea-
lizzate allo scopo di ottenere dei cambiamenti economici strutturali. Alcune, inve-
ce, hanno una motivazione principalmente finanziaria. Esse hanno comportato 
sia emissioni di azioni sia vendite dirette di proprietà. In Europa le principali 
candidate alla privatizzazione sono state le imprese di telecomunicazioni, le ban-
che e le imprese di elettricità. Negli Stati Uniti, tuttavia, la maggior parte delle 
privatizzazioni si sono avute nelle industrie che forniscono servizi locali. L'espe-
rienza indica che per la maggior parte le privatizzazioni aumentano l'efficienza e 
abbassano i costi. Il tasso di privatizzazioni è stato significativamente influenza-
to da considerazioni politiche locali. Le privatizzazioni risultano p'iù efficaci quan-
do possono stimolare la concorrenza. 
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
Volume 42 (1995), N. 6, 453-467 
T H E ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM O F 
COURNOT AND PARETO IN T H E 
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION H Y P O T H E S I S 
by 
A L B E R T O ZANNI * 
On his arrival in Lausanne, Pareto stated: "The point on which I differ 
from professor Walras is this: whereas he can already envisage a time when 
reliable information can be obtained and economic phenomena can be pre-
dicted with certainty [...], I, for my part, consider such a time to be very 
remote, so remote that I do not even discuss it". (Pareto, 1894, p. 162). 
1. I will start by clarifying the meaning of certain terms. Cournot says: 
(/') there is artificial monopoly when, in a given industry, there is an 
inventor, an entrepreneur endowed with industrial inventiveness; ii) if the 
inventor is the subject of a process of imitation by a duopolist, and 
then by a third, a fourth... oligopolist, then there is competition of producers 
(,concurrence des producteurs), i.e. monopolistic or oligopolistic competition; 
in) when monopolistic competition has developed to such an extent that the 
production qt of a firm becomes a negligible part of industrial production 
Q (i.e. when qJQ —» 0 and a price p becomes invariant in relation to A qt), 
then there is unlimited competition (concurrence indéfinie), i.e. perfect and 
atomistic competition. Of course, in the transition from monopoly to atomis-
tic competition, the price falls to cost level. Although Cournot's atomistic 
competition has made more converts than the Spanish Inquisition, we owe 
thanks to this great French scholar for employing three distinctly separate 
* Università di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Firenze. 
This article makes use of §§ 17-18 of a study by the author (1992) reporting some 
conversations that took place during a seminar in May 1989. In reusing these pages, I have 
profited from discussions with professors Marco Dardi and Aldo Montesano whom I wish to 
sincerely thank, discharging them from all responsibility for any possible error on my part. 
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terms denoting the process of monopolistic competition (the competition) 
itself, its initial state and its final state. 
Things are not so clear with Pareto. When Pareto uses the term free 
competition, he is sometimes alluding to monopolistic competition as under 
(ii) above, and sometimes to the limit state in which firms "make neither a 
profit, nor a loss". Hence when Pareto does not give us a clue with the 
expression "limit state of free competition", it is hard to understand what 
he means. 
Despite this difficulty, we might be able to reach an understanding of 
two of the points over which the students of Cournot, headed by Nash, have 
remained conspicuously silent k These points are, first, a criticism levelled 
at Cournot by Pareto, and second, the meaning of "type I " and "type II" in 
Pareto's Manuale. 
2. We know that Cournot's duopolists (1) and (2), who produce and 
sell quantities D1 and D2 at the ¡price p=f(D)~ where D = Dl + D2 and 
where ƒ is the inverse of the demand function D = F (p) - reach a stable 
equilibrium on the basis of a non-co-operative behaviour which is generally 
interpreted as follows: during the process of convergence towards equilib-
rium, each of the two duopolists maximises his profit, assuming his com-
petitor's quantity to be given. Pareto, too, adhered to this interpretation, 
which is justified by the way in which Cournot formalised his problem! 
However, this is not the whole story. First, it does not specify that 
Cournot's duopolists did not choose a quantity 2 but a price strategy, as 
sensed by Bertrand (in contrast to the game theorists, from Shubik and J. 
Friedman to Daughety). Secondly, it overlooks the fact that, for certain 
1 To the extent that Cournot oligopoly, a valuable anthology, edited by DAUGHETY (1988), 
does not even mention Pareto in the extended bibliography, pp. 45-60. 
2 The contemporary literature is unanimous in the opinion that Bertrand innovated on 
Cournot: i) because he suggested that the duopolists should select price as a strategic quantity 
instead of Cournot's quantity; ii) because he introduced the concept of consumers as "the 
third player". In my view, point (i) is untenable. In fact Bertrand (a) says explicitly that 
Cournot's duopolist "will lower his price to attract buyers", (b) accuses Cournot of not drawing 
the logical conclusions from this, and (c) explains this as due to an oversight: "because 
through a peculiar oversight, he introduces under the names D1 and D2 the quantities sold by 
the two competitors, and treating them as independent variables". What matters most is that 
when Cournot returned for the last time to his 1838 problems (COURNOT, 1877, p. 174), hé 
made it clear that the strategy of a duopolist, whose competitor's quantity is at the beginning 
a random given datum, is first a price strategy and only consequently a quantity strategy. Cournot 
says, and I quote, that the duopolist "pourrait, avec un avantage momentané, modifier le prix, 
et par suite sa production" (the italics are mine). 
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unspecified reasons, Cournot's duopolist responds with a certain delay to the 
competitor's price reduction. 
In fact, if we examine Cournot's thought, rather than the way in which 
he formalises it, we discover that the duopolist derives "a temporary benefit" 
(un "bénéfice momentané": Cournot, 1838, p. 92, 1960 p. 83) from a 
reduction in price. In brief, it is true that, in Cournot's view, duopolist (1) 
maximises his profit without having any "direct influence" on the quantity 
of (2). But Cournot also says that duopolist (1) will achieve this maximum 
"by properly adjusting his price" ("en modifiant convenablement le prix": 
1838 p. 89, 1960, p. 80); and since duopolist (1) temporarily derives a 
profit from this, we must assume that (2) does not respond instantly, i.e., 
for a certain period, (2) leaves his own price 3 unchanged, leaving himself 
open to the risk of losing customers. To put it in another way, Cournot 
conceived the idea, not encapsulated in his formalisation (in fact he speci-
fied that in competition the product is homogeneous and the price a single 
one) that in monopolistic competition separate prices coexist over the same 
period as a result of the diachronie behaviour of the "players". If my interpre-
tation is correct, I think I have to dedicate two remarks to the following 
criticism of Cournot by Pareto: 
"The fact that D1 and D2 can be taken as independent variables does not in the 
slightest imply the assumption of Cournot that the first monopolist cannot affect 
anything but D1 and the second only D2. On the contrary, in the case of [monopolistic] 
competition, which Cournot believes he is examining, the first monopolist can affect 
D2 in taking customers from his rival and vice versa" (Pareto, 1911, trans. 1968, p. 67 — 
the italics and brackets are additions of mine). 
My remarks are : i) it is true that Cournot's formalisation does not take 
into account that in monopolistic competition each of the duopolists could 
take customers away from his competitor; ii) but if I may distinguish be-
tween an author's thought and the way it is formalised, and if it is correct to 
interpret Cournot's thinking as meaning that the adversary responds with a 
certain timelag to the price strategy of a duopolist, then Pareto's interpreta-
tion of the French economist is a narrow one. In other words, I am con-
vinced that it is the alpha and omega of the adjustment mechanism that 
Pareto, as we shall see, calls "type I", that makes up the substance of 
Cournot's thinking. Rightly qr wrongly, I have just explained why I put 
Cournot's name before Pareto's in the title of this study, which is essentially 
devoted to the latter. 
5 On this issue, I am taking up an interpretation of DMITRIEV (1904), an author who, 
unfortunately, does not even appear in DAUGHETY'S bibliography (1988). 
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Before going on to Pareto, I should make some cautionary remarks. In 
the theory of industrial structures and general welfare Cournot's contribu-
tions were a good many, even if some of them have been ignored or 
forgotten. To give a first example, he maintained that with decreasing costs 
the greatest general welfare could be achieved through monopoly condi-
tions. Secondly, he held that the greatest general welfare was definitely 
guaranteed by co-operative agreement between monopolists when one pro-
duces {a), and the other (h), i.e. two products which, as complementary 
inputs, contribute towards the production of a third good {a, b)\ I should 
therefore warn the reader that the focus of this study will be only on 
Cournot as integrating Ricardo's long run "natural profit" with monopolistic 
competition. 
Although Walras, as we shall see later, opened the way to the theory 
of imperfect competition (product differentiation), he nevertheless closed 
many of the avenues previously opened by Cournot when he decided to 
overturn the latter's theory, starting off with the general hypothesis of 
unlimited competition and reintroducing monopolistic power as the excep-
tion to the rule (Walras, 1878 p. 1295). Marshall and Pareto, with their 
theories on temporary unreproducibilities and the rents associated with it, 
would later reopen these avenues. But with regard to Pareto, I must add a 
further cautionary remark. In the Manuale, Pareto analysed two types of 
competition: a) the competition that gratifies society by the nullification of 
profit associated with the reduction in product prices; b) parasitic competi-
tion that does not gratify society because the nullification of profit is asso-
ciated with an increase in costs. I must therefore warn the reader that this 
study will deal only with competitive process (a). 
3. Pareto links "type I" to free competition and "type II" to monopoly, 
making clear that these are behaviours referring to individual agents. 
I will start with monopoly, which raises no doubts. Pareto says that we 
have "type II" when an agent (we will only consider entrepreneurs) has the 
strength to impose his path, i.e. the price, on his contractors. The monopo-
list, he adds, determines the price deliberately, i.e. as a result of a conscious 
calculation. And what about free competition? 
In "type I", firms either accept the price in force on the market or 
quote one that is slightly less. Furthermore, they never deliberately modify 
4 Judging by DAUGHETY'S anthology (1988), it looks as if the theorists who refer to 
Cournot-Nash's non-co-operative duopoly have missed the co-operative aspect present in chapter 
IX of Cournot's Recherches (1838, but see also COURNOT, 1877, pp. 175-76). 
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the existing price — they modify it only involuntarily. Now, we are so used 
to repeating that, under conditions of perfect competition, every firm is 
devoid of any strategy, that it is a price-taker, that we have forgotten that 
Pareto also associates "type I " to the (monopolistic) competition process and 
that, in this process, there is always an infringer, a firm that rebels against 
the existing price In short, to continue to repeat that under Pareto's condi-
tions of free competition firms are always pricetakers means to forget that, 
during the process that culminates in the nullification of profit (a limit state 
which, in Pareto's view, does not have a real but a virtual nature), firms 
make small price reductions which are sometimes offensive and sometimes 
defensive. 
If we abandon the models suggested by the non-co-operative game 
sequence where the incomplete and imperfect information of the players 
is relevant (see J. Friedman 1991), Pareto's "type I" can be represented 
diagrammatically as follows. From the time tx of the diagram below, the 
fth firm chooses a penetration price (it slightly reduces the price from px to 
p2) in the belief that competing firms will keep market price px unchanged 
for a short while: over the period {tx, t2) the prediction turns out to be 
confirmed. At time t2 the competitors bring the price down to level p2 too. 
This would be the price for period (t2, t}) if another firm did not lower the 
price from p2 to p} and the process did not continue until period (t„_x, tn) 
when we would end up with a single price and no firm would be making a 
profit (limit state of free competition)6. This, synthetically, is "type I" as it 
is inferred from the Manuale and Manuel, even if Pareto, instead of talking 
about prices and price reductions, talked about firms that follow existing 
paths, or paths close to them 1. 
' See Chapter II, paragraphs 135-151 of Manuale and 116-131 of Manuel. 
6 AMOROSO (1930, p. 17) noted that the practical case of a firm that reduces its price to 
take customers away from its competitors cannot be mathematically represented. He did not 
realize that, instead of defending Cournot against Bertrand and Edgeworth, he should also have 
questioned the thinking of Cournot and Pareto. Most importantly, Amoroso failed to note that 
theories must also take into account price reductions that occur in competitive markets with a 
number of "imperfections". Later Maurice CLARK (1923) would follow Pareto in giving 
prominence to the fact that price reduction associated with the competition process implies the 
coexistence of different prices over the same period of time. 
7 An axiomatic representation should naturally look at prices as aggregates, each one of 
which, from one period to the other, displays at least one element that is lower than that of 
the previous period. There should also be restrictions on the size and number of firms over the 
period, as well as a hypothesis on the speed of the competitive process. In one of my early 
writings on Cournot (ZANNI, 1964) I suggested the hypothesis that firms were attracted into a 
given industry at a speed which increases in time with the level of industrial profit. In order to 
go beyond Cournot's hypothesis of an innovation una tantum, from which there follows the 
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Pareto says that "type I" is typical of the behaviour of agents under 
conditions of free competition, and "type I I " typical of a monopoly, leaving 
us in the dark about classification of the multiple intermediate industrial 
structures lying between the limit case of the inventor monopolist and the 
limit state of free competition. However, on the duopoly, as we have seen, it 
is Pareto who blamed Cournot for thinking he was formalising competition 
when he was actually formalising something quite different (as Pareto let it 
be understood, Cournot formalised an alternate symmetrical duopoly). We 
are therefore led to assume that, in Pareto's view, the behaviour of the 
duopolists, and more generally that of the oligopolists, is "type I", if they do 
not fight "ad excludendum" for absolute control of the market. Besides, Pareto 
explicitly states (Manuale p. 202, Manuel p. 205) that firms follow behav-
iour pattern I when the structural data of the industry allows the entry of a 
first and a second firm (duopoly) (today this case is much valued in the 
literature on contestable markets)8, but there is no "space for a third pro-
ducer" (ibid.) because otherwise the equilibrium would fall outside the 
region with non-negative profit indexes 9. 
In Pareto's view, however, it is "type II" that applies - one entrepre-
neur has the strength to impose his price — in the hypothesis of the asymmet-
rical duopoly of Pareto-Stackelherg, i.e. if one duopolist is a price-leader and 
dominates the other (Manuel, p. 60; it is worth noting that this type of 
gradual nullification of profit due to the workings of "concurrence", I assumed that, beyond a 
gradual expansion of supply over time, the entrepreneur would (with variations between one 
branch of industry and another) compare the profit to be made from a subset of existing 
industrial branches with the riskier, but higher profit to be had from a possible innovation. 
8 An assessment of Pareto in relation to the theory of contestable markets would require 
a separate article. I will therefore limit myself to recalling the "revisited book" by BAUMÖL, 
PANZAR a n d WILLIG ( 1 9 8 8 ) . 
9 For a wider explanation, refer to ZANNI (1992, p. 107). 
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oligopoly is not mentioned in the Manuale) 10. Pareto again made clear 
(ibid. p. 597) that when the duopolists fight to the bitter end for monopolis-
tic control - this is what Stackelberg calls Pareto's duopoly, but I think it is 
better to attribute it to Bertrand, Edgeworth and Pareto 11 — both rivals 
choose "type II", a case that Pareto believes overdeterminate 12. 
4. In the case of monopolistic competition, why are competing firms 
slow to respond to the small price reduction made by the infringing firm? 
Pareto, like Cournot, did not dwell on this problem. He merely said that he 
who slightly ("légèrement") modifies the slope of the path, i.e. who reduces 
the price, "en tire avantage, pendant un court moment" and that this behav-
iour would repeat itself through other firms until there was the total 
elimination of profits (Manuale p. 197-98, Manuel p. 201). One could 
obviously think that the infringing firm had organised itself for some time in 
10 I have called the hypothesis known as Stackelberg's asymmetrical duopoly "the Pareto-
Stackelberg duopoly". In fact in the Manuel (1909, pp. 601-2) Pareto proposes a description of 
asymmetrical duopoly as follows: there is a firm which controls 80% of the market. It is a 
price leader, i.e. it sets the price. There are other firms which accept this price as in free 
competition. Pareto does not say whether there are two or more than two price takers and I am 
convinced (see also § 5) that, in Pareto's view, "type I" implies a behaviour in relation to price 
and not necessarily the atomism of Cournot's unlimited competition. In the Italian literature 
this type of market was called partial monopoly, GALLI ( 1 9 5 6 , p. 4 4 9 et seq.) being perhaps 
the only one to have called it "imperfect competition". In order to analyse the significant case, 
already signalled by Pareto, where there is a single price taker, it is sufficient to define the 
isoprofit curves so as to take into account that quantity Q in relationship with the price is 
composed of only two parts: qx and q2. This is just what Stackelberg did in an article written 
in Italian (1933), whose importance is equalled only by the extent to which it has been ignored. 
11 STACKELBERG (1933, pp. 279-80) talks of Pareto's duopoly when the two duopolists 
defend, to the bitter end, the optimum which each one of them would achieve in the event of a 
monopoly, and he correctly concludes, that rather than being a pielude to an increase in the 
number of firms, this type of duopoly can culminate in growing industrial concentration. 
Although Pareto raised a formal problem on Edgeworth's duopoly (see note 12) that could 
justify the attribution of a type of duopoly to Pareto, the hypothesis of aggressive struggle is, 
essentially, reserved to Bertrand and Edgeworth. 
12 First in Manuel (p. 5 9 7 ) , and later in Economìe mathématique ( 1 9 1 1 ) , Pareto noted that 
if each duopolist seeks the highest profit, the problem is not mathematically indeterminate, but 
overdeterminate. Edgeworth understood that the remark was aimed at him, and in 1925, also 
remembering an early exchange of views with Marshall, he took advantage of the opportunity 
to note "that there is a certain indeterminateness about the use of the term "determinate" by 
economists" (1925, vol. II, p. 313). It seems to me that, in any case, Edgeworth accepted 
Pareto's distinction between indétermination and overdetermination even if this did not concern 
the substance of the issues at hand: "I dispute no man's definition of terms, concerned, rather, 
with the truth of propositions" (ibid., p. 313). In the meantime Pareto had died and there was 
no further chance for them to reach agreement once again. 
460 ALBERTO ZANNI 
order to expand production and supply and that the competing firms, at first 
caught unawares, might also require an adequate period of time to organise 
a similar response. In all this there is nothing that goes against Pareto's 
general theory (against its temporary unrëproducibilities), nor against his 
philosophy of market structures (we will mention these in the following 
paragraph). But I am of the opinion that in Pareto the delay in price reac-
tion by competing firms implies limited knowledge, i.e. an imperfectly 
transparent market13. 
What is certain is that Pareto's "type I" has been overlooked and has 
sometimes occasioned ambiguities. Zawadzki, for example, albeit an ex-
cellent historian of mathematical economics, restricts it to a limit case and 
associates it to the two conditions by which Pareto characterizes the com-
munity's maximum utility, without even warning that for Pareto this maxi-
mum, in pure economics, is guaranteed by collectivism rather than by free 
competition. In his attempt to do Pareto justice, Pier Carlo Nicola (1991) 
also gives an interpretation of Pareto's "type I" and "type II", which I did 
not think I could ascribe to (see Zanni, 1992 and 1993). Led astray by 
Pareto's way of expounding his theory, he is prompted to believe that "type 
I" also includes the behaviour which Pareto calls "type II". Nicola does not 
realize that Pareto never confuses "type I" and "type II" and that he 
includes the behaviour of firms in monopolistic competition in "type I", as 
long as they are not fighting for monopolistic control and trying to impose 
"type II", and as long as asymmetric oligopoly does not recur with one 
oligopolist pursuing "type II' and the others "type I". 
By making use of Pareto's price range, a range that is limited by path 
tx which is a feature of an inventor monopolist and by path tn of a 
firm representative of the limit state of free competition, we can say that 
"type I" applies both to this limit state and the monopolistic competition 
process extending from tx to tn, in the course of which certain firms make 
reductions that are sometimes offensive, and sometimes defensive. 
5. Having clarified that Pareto's free competition, "type I", includes 
13 Apart from the passage from Pareto in the epigraph, three considerations prompt me to 
think so. First, as the former executive of a business enterprise, he knew that price reductions, 
especially when granted by way of "rebates", often remain concealed. Second, for the purposes 
of a theory on business cycles and the persistence of consumer habits, he tried to formalise 
certain lags in the supply reaction to price variations. Finally, I have the impression that the 
completely "perfect" market (rationality, transparency, homogeneity, and punctiformity) is a 
construction of the 1930s polemically projected onto all the economists of the previous 
generations. 
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B 
(In Pareto's diagram A and B are two products and the prices are the slopes of the paths 
originating at Aí. In Pareto, when the path moves clockwise - when the price decreases - a 
representative consumer goes up on a curve of indifference with a growing utility index while 
a representative firm goes down on a curve of isoprofit with a lower index). 
Cournot's monopolistic competition, one can pose the question as to whether 
the limit state of Pareto's free competition, when firm profits are zero, is 
equivalent to the exacerbated atomism of Cournot's unlimited competition 
as expressed by q/Q^> 0. I am inclined to rule this out for the following 
reasons. 
Whereas Cournot (1838, p. 101, 1960, p. 90) regarded atomism on 
the production side as an approximately true hypothesis, Pareto, like Mar-
shall, saw the limit state of free industrial competition as a fiction devoid of 
any correspondence to reality, even though he thought it useful for isolating 
the tendency towards the nullification of profits derived from temporary 
unreproducibilities. And there is a further point. Cournot shows that he is 
fully aware of the fact that the duopoly and monopolistic competition as he 
himself conceptualises them, are a reflection of specific conditions and do 
not fully account for all possible cases. Despite the criticism levelled at him 
by Marshall, Wicksell and Sraffa, he is also fully aware of the fact that the 
monopolist's production costs could decrease to the extent of preventing the 
emergence of competition and of the duopoly itself. In a passage from 
Revues sommarie (1877, p. 178-79), a masterpiece of logic that seems to 
have escaped the attention equally of Cournots' admirers and of his critics, 
he goes as far as to uphold that, in such a case, the monopolist's profits 
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could be accompanied by greater community welfare 14. In any case, 
Cournot links the process of the nullification of profit to the multiplication 
of firms, while Pareto specifies the condition that the entry of new firms 
reaches a limit in the region of possible equilibria, the region with non-
negative profit indexes. In short, in Pareto's view, the structural conditions 
(the level of supply, the pattern of production costs, etc....) make it possible 
for profits to be nullified even with a limited number of firms 15. 
The fact that for Pareto, in the case of free competition, the involuntary 
modification of the market price derives from the firms' lack of knowledge 
as to the consequences of their actions, and not from Cournot's industrial 
atomism, appears to be deducible from Pareto's own writings, where he 
observes that it is only when there is a monopoly that a firm is in a position 
to calculate the effect of its own actions on the price of its inputs, and even 
then not always ("in practice this rarely follows and only in cases of monopo-
ly": Manuale, p. 318-19, Manuel, p. 335). On the other hand, in Cours, 
where he differentiates the functions in order to determine the agents' 
optimum in the hypothesis of free competition, Pareto raises the question of 
whether or not the price variations caused involuntarily should be consid-
ered. He concludes that "in practice, no one takes this into account" [Cours, 
§ 141), thus leading one to surmise that even the agents of free competition 
would, like the monopolist, consider prices to be variable if they could 
manage, in practice, to get to know, even slightly, these indirect effects. In 
other words, one gets the impression that in Pareto's view, to consider 
market prices as given under conditions of free competition is to depend on 
the lack of transparency. We have already come across this concept, as 
regards the delay in defensive reaction by the rival against a small price 
reduction by the "active" duopolist. 
After Cournot, it was rather Edgeworth (1881, p. 212) who insisted 
on an "indefinite number" of agents who in the event of free competition 
contract and recontract. It was rather Pigou who defined free competition 
by referring to the seller's behaviour in relation to the price — as explained 
on p. 20 in Pareto's Cours, but with the addition of one condition which on 
that page does not exist: "the essential note of simple competition is that 
the supply of each seller constitutes so small a part of aggregate supply 
that..." (Pigou, 1912, p. 180). It is a fact that Pareto links "type I" to free 
14 S e e ZANNI ( 1 9 9 2 , § 5 ) . v 
" Later on, AMOROSO (1921 and 1942): i) set the further condition that, in the equilib-
rium of competition, the price cannot be lower than the higher of two costs, the average cost 
and the marginal cost. He also determined the number of firms in a branch of industry, a point 
dealt with in a more sophisticated way by NOVSHEK and SONNENSHEIN (1988). 
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competition but nowhere does he equate free competition with the extreme 
atomism of Cournot's unlimited competition. In contemporary literature, 
Debreu (1959) has assumed a finite number of firms under free competition 
conditions and Hildenbrand (1983) has considered the two hypotheses to be 
contradictory. However, I doubt if Debreu was inspired by Pareto's non-
contradictory hypotheses. 
6. We should rather ask ourselves why Pareto does not specify 
whether "type I" or "type II" applies to some of the market structures which 
he took into consideration. For example, he does not say (though it can be 
easily intuited) which behaviour applies in the hypothesis that he calls 
imperfect competition or quasi-monopoly [Cours, §§ 841-42), i.e. in the case 
of productions which, by their very nature, (railways, tramways, gas and 
water supply, and so on) do not lend themselves to imitative competition 
and for which the optimum general welfare can, in his opinion, be achieved 
through public intervention. Neither does Pareto specify which behaviour 
prevails within the hypothesis which we currently call imperfect competition, 
i.e. when firms which benefit from transient profits as a result of product 
differentiation coexist. On the point of product differentiation, which was to 
have a disruptive effect on the concept of industry and the theory of value 
in the thirties 16, it is strange that Pareto did not resort to the concept of 
cross elasticity which is so omnipresent in Pantaleoni, and, also analytically, 
in the later Marco Fanno (1926). It was in fact with the concept of cross 
elasticity that Robert Triffin (1940), would later try to heal the rift in 
economic theory, even though he was unaware of the developments I have 
just described. 
These lacunae in Pareto seem to be accounted for by his philosophy on 
market structures, "free competition" and duopoly in particular. Finally, this 
point of view deserves consideration, as follows: i) unlike Marx, Sweezy, 
Steindl, (and even Schumpeter, Amoroso, and Sylos Labini, to name only 
deservedly famous scholars), Pareto did not identify a general tendency both 
towards the disappearance of small businesses and towards industrial concen-
tration; it) Pareto considered that monopolistic power was more a feature of 
production than of consumption; iii) in the Manuel (mainly in the mathemat-
ical appendix, but see also §§ 61-70 of Chap. IV, devoted to substitute 
products) Pareto proposed a much more elaborate theory of market struc-
" In this respect, refer to BECATTINI (1962) and GEORGESCU ROEGEN (1967) , bearing 
in mind that Becattini has been trying for over 20 years to reconstruct a dialectic theory that 
does not revolve around the concept of industry, but around a system of localised businesses 
within a "district". 
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tures than the one explicated in the Cours and the Manuale, for the reason 
that the profit associated with product differentiation, in Walras' imperfect 
competition hypothesis, had given rise to much debate and many ambi-
guities, at least in Italy 17 ; iv) Pareto realized that, when agents with monopo-
listic power are structurally few, two at minimum, reality has many more 
verses than Horace's poems, i.e. it is open to a variety of solutions, quite 
irrespective of the innovations and the fortuities inherent in Cournot's phi-
losophy [fata viam invenient). However, Pareto did not deem it necessary to 
remove this type of indétermination by pursuing the thousand or so "types 
of intermediate markets" ranged between competition and monopoly which 
were later the subject of countless writings in the thirties. While as a 
sociologist he debated why, in certain societies, human inventiveness should 
take the form of profit-making industrial inventiveness, as an economist he 
went no further than to focus only on the main forms of monopolistic power 
— we might even say of Paretian unreproducihilities — that restrain merely 
temporarily the basic tendency towards the wiping out of profit and the 
consequent price reduction. Looking at it more closely, the law of imitation 
which the sociologist Cournot (1861, vol. II, Chap. XIV) recognised in the 
globalization of the scientific and technical discoveries of the modern era, 
was an extension of a classical law of economics (imitative competition 
transfers scientific progress to the community via price reductions), which 
in substance was accepted by Pareto as well. 
The fact that for a long time now the process through which the fruits 
of productive progress are distributed to society is no longer that of competi-
tion as discussed by Ricardo, Cournot, Walras and Pareto, i.e. price reduc-
tions for products and monetary remunerations unaltered, but instead 
through another process, that of the increase in monetary remunerations 
(favoured by Keynes "on account of... the greater ease of adjustment from 
17 In lecture XLI of the 2nd edition of Eléments (1889), Walras uses the expression free 
competition to mean the freedom of entry of firms which produce heterogeneous goods for 
classes of separate agents (the same chocolate wrapped in different ways), deriving profits that 
the competition tends to wipe out. GRAZIANI (1894) saw in this the proof that Walras' 
diversified prices are compatible only with a monopoly. It is a pity that TRIFFIN (1940) missed 
the fact that imperfect competition as introduced by Pareto in Manuel constitutes an implicit 
defence of Walras. The correction of a presumed mistake made by Walras, a correction which 
CASSOLA (1911, p. 24) attributed to JANNACCONE (1904, p. 325), was also overlooked. See the 
study I made in 1993, p. 255. After the famous Proudhon-Marx polemic on the Philosophy of 
Poverty and the Poverty of Philosophy, the suspicion that the concepts of competition, product 
and industry should harbour dialectic shades probably resurfaced in the mind of some Italian 
economists, when they read that Walras' free competition included the production of 
heterogeneous goods. 
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decaying to growing industries", 1936 p. 271), is a problem that I have 
deliberately not touched on. A comparison between Keynes' long run 
mechanism and Pareto's parasitic competition (also omitted in this study) 
might demonstrate the value of theoretical archetypes and at the same time 
show how vulnerable they are to the onslaughts of history. 
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IL MECCANISMO DI AGGIUSTAMENTO DI COURNOT E PARETO NEL-
L'IPOTESI DI CONCORRENZA MONOPOLISTICA 
Questo scritto si occupa dei comportamenti che Pareto chiama il "tipo I" e 
il "tipo II" ed inizia con un confronto fra i duopolisti di Cournot e il "tipo I" 
paretiano. L'autore ritiene che questo punto della teoria di Pareto ha dato luogo 
a malintesi e che è sfuggito all'attenzione anche dei seguaci di Cournot che 
fanno capo a Nash. 
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ASSETS VALUATION UNDER CONTINUOUS TIME: 
SOME REMARKS 
by 
GIANLUCA CASSESE * 
I. Introduction 
In the last fifteen years the theory of finance has been increasingly 
recast in the framework of continuous-time, stochastic models. The most 
immediate rationale for this translation comes maybe from the acknowledge-
ment that markets work at an increasingly faster pace, approximating a 
continuous profile. But apart from realism there are at least two good 
reasons to adopt continuous time, entertwined one with the other. Under 
discrete time there is no clear and well founded distinction between flows 
and stocks since flows cannot but be defined as differences in stocks and are 
related to the "unit period" as a whole \ On the other hand if the time set is 
discrete we considerably constrain the ability of individual agents to choose 
the transaction dates and to differ one from the other under this respect: 
discrete time implies fixed intervention dates. 
All this notwithstanding, the main feature of recent finance models is 
by far a technical one. It is in fact because of the existence of the theory of 
stochastic integration and of the powerful tools it provides economists with 
that it has become so common to write one's model with the specification of 
a continuous time set. The exploitation of this peculiar technique has 
* Istituto di Economia Politica,, Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Milano. 
I would like to express my gratitude to Andrea Beltratti for his encouragement. I also 
acknowledge my intellectual debt with Professor Lucien Foldes who introduced me to these 
studies. All errors are my own. 
1 Hence under discrete time it does not matter if the underlying model is specified in 
terms of stocks rather than of flows. This distinction is, on the contrary, essential with 
continuous time stochastic processes since here stocks will not in general admit to be 
represented as the integral of a corresponding density. 
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proved to be very efficient and has given both analytically nice and economi-
cally intuitive results. Among these one should mention the derivation of 
the so called CAPM (Capital Asset Pricing Model) and CCAPM (Consump-
tion based Capital Asset Pricing Model) formulas. The former explains the 
drift of the dividend process in terms of the "correlation" between the 
diffusion of that same process and the coefficient of relative risk, and it is 
derived as the solution of the martingale problem for asset prices 2. The 
latter describes the choice of the portfolio shares in terms of the "covari-
ance" among the securities' yield and optimal consumption. This formula is 
derived from the maximisation of intertemporal utility under the constraint 
given by the stochastic differential equation describing the accumulation of 
wealth by means of the Hamilton-]acobi-Bellman equation. 
It is often remembered that there are conditions to be satisfied in order 
for such formulas to apply and that because of these requirements there are 
aspects that are forcefully to be left aside. On the other hand it is usual to 
comment upon the renowned efficient markets hypothesis that these models 
allow somehow to revive. The purpose of this paper is to exactly recall a 
number of conditions that CAPM and CCAPM imply and to discuss them 
in some connection with the efficient markets hypothesis. In fact we aim at 
deriving very general statements and to compare them with the better 
known and more explicit results that usually appear in the literature. To this 
end we will mainly make use of some results very common in the theory of 
finance and by means of these give a (hopefully) elementary explanation of 
how CAPM and CCAPM may fail to explain the basic valuation formula if 
we allow for some sort of discontinuity. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the first paragraph we sketch the 
model and define the main variables that appear in it. In the second one 
we give a necessary and sufficient condition under which an equivalent 
martingale measure may be said to exist: the result, being very general, is 
also quite criptical and far less palatable than the current formulations in 
terms of relative risk coefficients and the like. A few special results will be 
derived under the conditions that have very recently appeared in the 
literature. In paragraph three we illustrate the CCAPM formula giving a 
hint about its derivation and assuming in particular absolute continuity 
of the price characteristics. This will serve as a survey of the subject. 
Eventually we will illustrate in a simple way some criticisms that may be 
raised against the model itself. 
2 That is the problem of finding an appropriate measure under which prices follow a 
martingale process, as will be explained below. 
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II. The Model 
Let it be given a stochastic basis, (12, 5, P); (AJT), where (12, P) 
is a standard probability space, T = [0, T] is the time domain and (A,|T) 
denotes a filtration satisfying the usual assumptions 3 with A0 — { 0 , 12} 
and At = S. All processes to be mentioned in the sequel will be defined 
on such a basis and up to indistinguishability. Adaptness to (AjT) will 
hence be the standard measurability requirement. Notation for processes 
will be as follows: & and § will respectively ̂ indicate the classes of optional 
and predictable processes, 9ît (resp. 91t/oc, 9K, 9lt2) will denote the class 
of martingales (resp. local-, uniformly integrable-, square integrable-
martingales), decomposing in a unique way into a continuous and a totally 
discontinuous part, i.e. 91t = 9 T © Sit'd; <D (resp. d) will be used for 
the set of finite variation processes (resp. of integrable variation) and S 
(resp. BP) for semimartingales (resp. special semimartingales). Hence, 
s = ^-loc + y and Sp = m i o c © («D H §) are the standard definitions 4  
for semimartingale and special semimartingale processes, thanks to which 
I whenever X e B we may like to write X — Mx + Vx with Mx e 911¡ 
and V e 5 ) ) - , the decomposition will be understood to be unique if and 
only if V* e D d that is whenever X e §f • [•,•]: S X S and 
< • , • > : 9]Lcloc X 9tt^c - > 9) are the usual square bracket and angle bracket 
processes, the former defined as the quadratic (co)variation of two semimar-
tingales, the latter as the continuous part of the former and having as its 
domain the continuous, local martingale part of semimartingale processes. 
For any process X, PX will denote its predictable projection ; for X e Aloc, Xp 
I will be its dual predictable projection or compensator defined as the unique 
predictable process such that X - Xp e 91lhc 5. Eventually, for any £ 6 S, 
& (£) will stand for the unique solution of the Doleans-Dade stochastic 
differential equation Xt = X0 + I Xs_dÇ,6; £ ( • ) will be its inverse: 
" 0 
a noticeable property of these two transformations is that S, 91lloc, 9k 
happen to be stable spaces with respect to them. 
3 That is, («') every <T-algebra A, is completed with all the P-null sets of S, (ii) s < t 
implies As c A„ i.e. monotonicity and (Hi) As = f l A„ i.e. right-continuity. 
t > s 
4 A completely different but equivalent definition for semimartingales has been proposed 
by PROTTER ( 1 9 8 6 and 1990) . 
3 F o r a rigorous def ini t ion see MEYER ( 1 9 7 4 ) or JACOD and SHIRYAEV ( 1 9 8 8 , p. 32 ) . 
6 Its explicit formula is given by S (Qt = exp £ r - -1 < Q , Q > r j 77 (1 + At.) e~At-t. 
I D I t -c T * 
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The price process — inclusive of net returns — will be modelled via 
a d + 1 - dimensional, strictly positive semimartingale (that is strictly 
positive for any / e T , P-a.s.), qe S + + ; the Doléans-Dade transform of 
prices, £ = £ (q) = ( £ (q°) ... £ (qd) )T will play a central part in the 
model and its characteristics will be indicated by V and M' for i = 0, ..., d\ 
for i — 0 we assume M' = 0 and V' to be continuous, thus identifying 
the corresponding title to a riskless bond. The portfolio strategy will 
be indicated by a vector process 9 belonging to the © c L2 ([#]) of 




9S_ dqs is thus well defined for any / P-a.s. 
The individual deriving utility from consumption will have to invest an 
initial wealth of W0 and the proceedings of future private income, et, into 
portfolio shares in order to finance consumption all over the given time 
period, according to the following stochastic differential equation 
Wt = W0 + f 9s_dqs - f (cs- e,) ds V[0> nt, P-a.s. (1) 
where Wt = 9t • qt. We could either impose Wt > 0 V [0¡T] t, P-a.s. or 
define the time horizon through stopping by setting T = {inf te T| W (t, u>) 
< 0}: let © be defined so as to satisfy the former constraint. Let C (W0, 0, e) 
be the set of those consumption processes c e C — hence optional and non 
negative — that satisfy (1) for given initial wealth, portfolio strategy and 
perspective income; C (W0> ©, e) be the union of such sets over ©; 
omission of the term W0 will be for ease of notation while e will be 
suppressed only when identically nil. 
A representative agent is supposed to maximise the cumulative ex-
pected value of the felicity function u and the expected value of utility from 
final wealth, that is 
max <P(c) = E[ [ u (c (w, t); co, t) dt + V (W r ) j (2) 
ceC(e.e) | J o ) 
All utility functions will be taken to be twice continuously differentia-
ble with first derivative equal to infinity at the origin and concave. An 
7 Superscript T denotes transposition. 
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auxiliary process that will appear later is the portfolio shares process defined 
q> 0> 
as n>, = 1 - for all j and as n. in vector notation: ft, will be the vector 
Wt ' 
obtained from nt deleting the first component. 
CAPM deals with a suitable way of transforming the budget constraint 
(1), while CCAPM is to be derived from the explicit solution to (2). In 
order to perform such transformation of the budget constraint and to 
recover a reduced form, suppose ß e S + + . It is thanks to a straightforward 
application of Ito's lemma that we may conclude that 
W^WJt = W0+i Ws_dßs+ f ßs_dWs + [W,ßl 
•> 0 2 o 
= f Ws_ßs_d£(ß)s+ í Ws_ßs_n^_d£(q)s + 
do do 
(3) 
W_nld£ (q), ß - [ csßs_ds - f c s d s , ß 
' Jo . J 
= W0 + j Ws_ßs_n]_d£(qß)s_j' Csßsd. 
W + Ws_n]_dl f 
J n 
c,d s 
Different normalisation procedures may be considered in order to ob-
tain a single equation out of an uncountable number, the most popular of 
which is labelled CAPM. 
III. A General CAPM 
A martingale density for q is a stochastic process Z e 3ìt/oc such that 
q Z 6 91t/oc; Q (B) « E {Zt 1B} for B e At and 1B its indicator i s j i 
martingale measure for q locally equivalent to P. If Z, q Z belong to 9tt 
then we shall call Q an equivalent martingale measure (for q). Suppose 
such a process Z exists and is unique: in this case we will say that markets 
are complete 8 and this will be considered equivalent to local martingales 
8 For a formal proof of the equivalence of this definition with the more common one, see 
HARRISON and PLISKA ( 1 9 8 1 and 1 9 8 3 ) . 
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admitting the so called representation property with respect to q9. The 
martingale nature of transformed price processes is commonly interpreted 
as a change to no-arbitrage units and is related to absence of arbitrage. 
Notice that all involved processes and functionals are invariant under 
equivalent probability transforms since the filtration itself is. It is a well 
known fact of financial economics that the martingale transform of prices 
may fail to be fully equivalent, i.e. that the transformed price process may 
only be taken to be a local martingale. What goes wrong with an infinite 
time domain is an integrability requirement which does not allow for a full 
exclusion of arbitrage opportunities although restricts their set to very 
special cases such as the so called doubling strategies 10. In fact a necessary 
and sufficient condition for local equivalence of martingale measures to 
translate into a global property is that Q {sup, Zt < °° } = 1 and P {inf, Zt  
> 0 } = 1 n . Nevertheless some interesting interpretations are still possible 
even in the weaker form, since existence of a martingale density and the 
non negativity constraint on the wealth process are easily shown to be a 
sufficient condition to rule out arbitrage opportunities. In fact these two 
conditions imply from (3) above that, expressing processes in no arbitrage 
units (i.e. with ß = Z), Wt + ct is a non negative local martingale,  
J o 
hence a supermatingale, so that W0 > EP j WT + ƒ ct d ¿j = Eq j WT+ 
I. 
5 The set 9K/0C on a given filtration admits the representation property with respect to 
X e 9K£,C if for each Y e 9Rfoc there exists a process H e S such that E (/ HT d\ <X> H) < °o 
and such that Yc = j HdX. This is in fact only the continuous part of the theorem, since the 
representation of the discontinuous part of it is much more complicated and less intuitive. For a 
general statement see JACOD and SHIRYAEV (1988, p. 172). It has to be strongly remarked that 
this is a condition hinging on the nature of the underlying filtration: in fact it amounts, 
roughly speaking, to restrict the information on (the local martingale nature of) processes to 
what is actually revealed by prices. For an example of the usual assumptions on the filtration 
see KARATZAS e t al. ( 1 9 8 6 a n d 1 9 9 1 ) . 
10 O n d o u b l i n g strategies see HARRISON and KREPS ( 1 9 7 9 ) . 
11 This conclusion may easily be derived from JACOD and SHIRYAEV (1988, proposition 3.5, p. 
154). 
12 Portfolio and consumption processes that belong to the budget set satisfy hence this 
inequality, under completeness of markets also the reverse holds (a proof of this fact may for 
e x a m p l e b e f o u n d in C o x a n d HUANG, 1 9 9 1 , and in JEANBLANC-PIQUÉ a n d PONTIER, 1 9 9 0 ) so 
that the latter may be taken to be an equivalent definition of the budget set. 
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We state hence the following fairly general result. 
PROPOSITION 1. For Z e 91l!oc the following is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the existence of a martingale density: 
for at least one decomposition of the semimartingale £ (q). 
Proof. Consider qZ e 9K/oc £ [q Z) = £ (q) + £ (Z) + [£ (q), 
£ (Z)] e m.loc and since, by definition, £ (Z) e 9t£/oc then £ (q Z) - M -
£ (Z) = V + [£ (q), £ (Z)] 6 9tt/oc fi 9h hence this must be a process 
of locally integrable variation 13 and its dual predictable projection must 
thus be nil14. All the decompositions implied are unique up to indistinguish-
ability, hence also the reverse implication holds. 
This proposition also admits of several further specifications, among 
which the following is worth mentioning. 
COROLLARY 1. For Z e 91T/OC the following is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the existence of a martingale density: 
local martingales into a continuous and a totally discontinuous part. Since 
the integral of the variation is a norm for processes in &loc, the fact that 
X e a f c c a n d X J e 91îfoc f] 9) c= implies, by triangular inequality, Xe e-
&loc- replacing X by V + [£ (q), £ (Z)] this argument allows to apply 
the compensation procedure component by component. The last step is 
made by remarking that for X e äloc, P(A X) = (A X)p so that (5) follows. 
COROLLARY 2 . Suppose that q e Bp and qZ e BP then condition ( 4 ) 
reduces to: 
(V + [£ (q), £ (Z)])P = 0 ( 4 ) 
V = - (£ (Z), My (6) 
15 JACOD and SHIRYAEV ( 1 9 8 8 , l emma 3 .11 , p. 29) . 
" Ibidem (theorem 3.18, p. 33). 
15 Condition (6) is also derived by BACK (1991, theorem 1, pp. 379-382) and by SCHWEITZER 
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where (• )p coincides here with the predictable compensator of £ (Z) M. 
If q e y then also £ (q) e hence V e S, [£ (Z, V] e *)) 0 31t, 
Œ £\,¡oc 16 and its compensator is nil; the finite variation part of a special 
semimartingale is also of integrable variation 17 and coincides with its dual 
projection: according to the same argument appearing in the proof of the 
preceding corollary, (4) is then equivalent to V + ([£ (Z), M])P = 0. 
An application of the integration by parts formula, standard properties 
of stochastic integrals and uniqueness of the decomposition for special 
semimartingales show that (£ (Z), M)p coincides with ([£ (Z), M])P. 
Expression (5) is to be considered as a generalised CAPM formula in 
which £ (Z) plays the role of the so called relative risk coefficient. The usual 
CAPM formula may be derived as follows. 
COROLLARY 3 . Suppose that markets are complete and that prices are 
continuous then (4) translates into 
that is dV = hd <M> for some h e L2(<M>). 
Proof. Continuity of q implies that [£ (Z), £ (<?)] = [£ (Z), Aí] e äloc  
and ([£ (Z), M])p = (£ (Z), Aí); from market completeness we know that 
This is the familiar formula asserting that the drift of the dividend 
process may be explained in terms of the "correlation". (7) being a special 
case of (5), as it has been shown, we may thus employ the latter as a 
benchmark to evaluate departures from such limiting assumptions as the 
ones appearing in the former. 
Remark that in the more general case also appears a discontinuous 
CAPM formula, and, particularly, that the predictable component of jumps 
has to be compensated by correlation with the jumps in the relative risk 
coefficient. This first rules out the unpredictable part of processes: for what 
(1992 theorem 3, pp. 370-371) but in a way considerably more complex and less general than 
what done here. 
16 It is a direct consequence of the so called Yoeurp's lemma, for which see JACOD and 
SHIRYAEV (1988, proposition 4.49 c), p. 52). 
17 See propos i t ion 4 . 2 3 in JACOD e SHIRYAEV ( 1 9 8 8 , p. 4 4 ) . 
dV « d <M> (7) 
there exists h e L 2 ( < A f > ) such that £ (Z)t = h J d Ms. 
o 
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concerns arbitrage we may content ourselves with processes whose times of 
discontinuity be announced by an appropriate sequence of stopping times. 
In fact a trading strategy, by the very same way in which it has been 
defined, cannot be made to depend upon inaccessible events. Secondly, the 
jumps of the relative risk process will be orthogonal to jumps of the price 
process that occur only in the local martingale part, and let the finite 
variation component unchanged. Thus, following Back (1991), we may like 
to identify jumps in the local martingale part as idiosyncratic risk compared 
to the general risk, reflecting in the jumps of the process £ (Z). 
General models further assume absolute continuity of the price process 
characteristics from which it is easy to eventually derive 
F, span (Zt) (8) « 
where ßt = A-V (co, t), rt = ~ Vo (co, t) and I , is the matrix WA 
dt dt ' 
with ay = d- <M', M¡> 11, j > 1. (8) is often considered to be the at 
explicit formulation of CAPM. 
IV. A General CCAPM 
A natural candidate for the relative risk process is the marginal utility 
from consumption along the optimal path. A general result by Foldes 
(1990) implies that with continuous price processes (but regardless of com-
pleteness of markets), problem (2) admits solution if and only if this is the 
case: discontinuities, though, provide an exception to such a rule. In order 
to recover the optimal solution to the consumption problem, a standard tool 
is the so called Hamilton-]acobi-Bellman equation that we now propose to 
discuss. 
Let us adopt the following notation. Let Ct be the restriction of the 
consumption set C to processes starting at t (and nil up to then), and 
Ct (Wt) the budget set defined over Ct with initial wealth Wr Define hence 
f(t, Wt) . f max^j ƒ u(ct)Js+V(ßT. qT) | 
and A (t, c) = f u (cs)ds + V (t, Wt), with Wt = W0 - f etds + 
Jo J 0 
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� ' 
V n 
Osdqs. Being a submartingale, A may be decomposed in a unique 
way — according to the well known Doob-Meyer theorem — as A (t, c) — At -
+ Mt with At an increasing process and Mt e 917/oc. Actually, A {t, c) 6 917/oc 
when c is the solution to (2) and only then: so the problem is formally 
equivalent to 
0 = min At (c), i.e. 0 = min E [A (/, c) - A (r, c)| Ar}, with t > r (9) 
c c 
If A may be proved to be twice continuously differentiable, then, by a 
straightforward application of Ito's lemma and passing to the limit under the 
integral sign, the HJB equation is derived, in the following formulation 
» 
0 = + maxi « (e, t) - Vwct + VwWtn]dV + 
c, 0 I 
(10) 
^ V w w W j n J d m n , J 
Under absolute continuity of the characteristics of the process £ (q), 
(10) is equivalent to 
0 = 9t + max « (c, t) - Vwct + 
c, 0 
(ID 
0 ywwtnjßi + 2 „ „ 2 
Denoting by v the inverse of the marginal utility of consumption and 
by nt the portfolio vector deprived of the first component, simple differentia-
tion eventually gives 
c* = v{Vw) (12.a) 
^ ! r Ì w w W £ z A * 
v w (12.b) 
that, under the assumption that prices be at their equilibrium level, coin-
cides with CCAPM. Notice that the continuity properties of ^ and of the 
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utility function (12.a) and (12.b) imply that the optimal consumption and 
portfolio rules are adapted to the natural filtration of the price process (i.e. 
the minimal filtration with respect to which the price process is measurable), 
(z4/|T). This is interpreted to mean that optimal policies may be decided and 
implemented on the basis of the information revealed by prices: that is 
markets are efficient18. 
From comparison of (9) versus (12) it stems out that the former is a 
necessary and sufficient condition, while the latter only sufficient: this im-
plies that even under the most favourable conditions equation (12) need not 
hold for all optimal solutions. Furthermore, in order to recover equation 
(12) the price process must be absolutely continuous, the value function 
must be twice continuously differentiable and it must be possible to pass to 
the limit under the integration sign. We try to comment on the economic 
meaning of these analytical conditions. 
For what concerns absolute continuity of the price process, this is a 
requirement without which the described optimal policies may simply not 
exist at some date/event, but its nature is hardly economic at all. It is in 
the very nature of stochastic continuous models not to imply absolute 
continuity and it is on the contrary quite curious that economists who seem 
to appreciate this class of models still are keen on solutions defined date by 
date. Differentiability of the value function has been proven for quite 
general classes of processes 19 making full use of the complete markets 
18 A rather explicit formulation of the optimal consumption process may be derived 
from (11) by noting that its solution may be conjectured to be a C2 function c* = f(W*). 
Then differentiating (10) with respect to W gives 
0 = W + W - c) + ~ tfV w wW2 AtEA + ¥V 
Hence, by îto's rule, we get 
dZ(u(c*)) = AAZ-WF-ATdM _ rdt 
Aw 
From this we conclude that /') u (c*) q° e ?SZloc and is a martingale density for the 
normalised price process ii) the optimal consumption plan has the form 
It 
"-'M-f f'•<•)) 
0 S S S J 0 
" See for example JEANBLANC-PIQUÉ and PONTIER (1990), and references therein. 
480 GIANLUCA CASSESE 
hypothesis: under incompleteness it is not clear whether this property will 
continue to hold and the HJB equation to be a viable approach 20. Even if 
it did, however, the efficient markets corollary of the CCAPM would 
Clearly, if e is not adapted to (Af|T) so will also be c* 21 : in this case 
the agent will own private information deriving from labour income. This is 
the way to introduce insider trading into this class of models. 
Eventually, exchanging limit and expected value implies ruling out the 
existence of jumps that may not be offset by an appropriate choice of the 
semimartingale decomposition: clearly the prescribed optimal consumption 
policy would not exist if for some date/event the finite variation part of 
the involved processes presented a jump. This kind of discontinuity would 
affect the choice problem in exactly the same way as the no-arbitrage 
one. In order to see this more clearly consider a CRRA utility function, 
with coefficient S, and constant drifts p and define the set Q (Z) = {q¡\p 
e span (Zt)}22 to be the set of financial prices whose finite variation 
component is absolutely continuous with respect to the quadratic covariation 
of its martingale part. This is the set on which equation (12.b) has solution, 
explicitly given by nt = — at — where p = Etat — that is by a linear and 
20 If the value function is not twice continuously differentiable the HJB solution is 
replaced by the so called viscosity solutions. See DUFFIE and ZARIPHOPOULOU (1993) for an 
application. v 
21 Notice though that the efficient markets hypothesis is not entirely ruled out even in 
this particular case. In a genuine equilibrium model the price process is in fact not given but 
results from market clearing conditions and so is [Af\í). Hence adaptness of private endowments 
to the latter filtration may be restored through tâtonnement. 
22 Here we consider Z as a primitive of the model. This is legitimate since, under complete 
markets, the local martingale processes involved in the model are all derived from a given set of 
martingales that has the representation property with respect to the given filtration. 
0 
and substitute into the first order conditions to find 
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hence continuous function. Since Q (X) is open by definition in the topology 
of pointwise convergence, consider a sequence {q"} such that qnt e Q (2) and 
q»-+ qtf Q (Z) and let { < } and { < } be the corresponding sequences. 
Since by definition a" diverges, we will have lim ||TT [qn)\\ = °° because 
p e span (Z) implies that as long as the variability of prices is reduced 
agents will be less and less able to hedge against the risk implicit in the 
returns structure - so there will not be any longer a risk neutral measure -
unless going unboundedly short in some asset: it is the case for arbitrage. 
Jumps in the price process that may not be entirely compensated pose exacdy 
the same kind of problems since their effect is to violate the condition 
qt e Q (£). Cases as the general diffusion processes, resulting from a sum 
of pure diffusion and point processes, may still be admitted 23 but a more 
general class of discontinuous processes will definitely imply a break down 
of equation (12) while still being perfectly compatible with equation (9) 
above. 
V. Conclusions 
In the previous paragraphs we touched upon some well established 
results of financial economics, the way they are usually expressed in contin-
uous time stochastic models. We derived very general formulations for 
CAPM and CCAPM and specialized them later on to more familiar expres-
sions. Although equation (6) has quite recendy been considered to be of its 
own interest, nevertheless it has been remarked that in general the solutions 
to these models are constrained to satisfy conditions that are quite restrictive 
in contrast with the great generality that the adopted technique would allow. 
In fact it is for example widely accepted to specify completely the price 
process - in most cases a Wiener or a diffusion process - while it would be 
economically much more interesting and meaningful to describe prices by 
selection of an appropriate class - that cannot be but semimartingales. 
Due to the technical burden of stochastic calculus, financial models are 
not always perfectly clear about the role of the underlying assumptions. For 
instance, assuming completeness of markets is by itself quite near to assume 
that they are efficient, while it would be most interesting to establish a 
clearcut difference between the two concepts. On this particular point it has 
to be recalled that apart from this special case the structure of individual 
endowments will matter when deciding upon optimal consumption and 
23 This case has been exhaustively analysed in JEANBLANC-PIQUÉ and PONTIER (1990) to 
which the interested reader is referred. See also BARDHAN and CHAO (1993). 
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portfolio plans. We showed this in a particularly naive way, i.e. assuming to 
have enough continuity of the value function to apply the Hamilton-]acobi-
Bellman equation. A proper investigation of this aspect would however 
require more general solution concepts. 
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LA VALUTAZIONE DELLE ATTIVITÀ IN TEMPO CONTINUO: ALCU-
NE OSSERVAZIONI 
In gran parte dei modelli finanziari è divenuto consueto far uso delle 
tecniche del calcolo stocastico anche qualora si attribuisca significato economico 
esclusivamente ad alcune specifiche formulazioni dei risultati. Lo scopo di questo 
lavoro è quello di affrontare alcuni problemi finanziari classici ad un livello 
di analisi assai generale e mostrare quanto restrittive siano le assunzioni che 
debbono essere fatte al fine di ottenere espressioni sufficientemente ben fatte. 
Si esprimono inoltre alcuni commenti circa la proposizione generale secondo la 
quale il CCAPM supporti l'ipotesi dei mercati efficienti. 
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Yu HSING * 
I. Introduction 
Over the years the federal government has passed laws and created 
programs to reduce cost and increase work incentive of the welfare system. 
These include the 1961 Unemployed Parent (UP) program, the 1967 Work 
Incentive Program (WIN), the 1981 Community Work Experience Pro-
gram (CWEP), the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) 
program established by the Family Support Act of 1988, the Child Support 
Enforcement (CSE) program, and the 1990 Head Start program. To further 
overhaul the welfare system, the White House, the Congress and states have 
recently proposed the following: to only allow welfare recipients to stay in 
the system for a maximum of two years, to require compulsory work after 
two years either in the private or the government sector, to combine numer-
ous welfare programs into block grants, to give individual states more auto-
nomy and flexibility, to repeal or reduce welfare benefits for legal immi-
grants and unmarried mothers who are under the age of 18, to take meas-
ures to reduce teen pregnancy, to build orphanages to raise children from 
unfit parents, and the like. Disagreements are found among different politi-
cal parties and states, and these proposals may or may not be passed by the 
Congress 1. 
* Department of Economics and Business Research, College of Business, Southeastern 
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This research project was supported by a summer release time grant provided by the 
College of Business, Southeastern Louisiana University, The author is grateful to an anonymous 
referee and the editor for valuable comments. Any errors remain the author's responsibility. 
Empirical work was done with Shazam Version 7.0. 
1 For reviews and criticisms of the public policy on welfare, see BURTLESS (1990), 
CHAMBERS ( 1 9 8 9 ) , GIDEONSE and MEYERS ( 1 9 8 9 ) , and GUERON ( 1 9 9 0 ) . 
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It is proper to re-examine the determinants of the size of welfare 
recipients across states so that the government may find ways to improve 
the system. This paper differs from previous studies in several aspects. First, 
three types of benefits - cash payments, food stamps, and Medicaid (medi-
cal care provided for the poor) - are considered. This method may be 
compared with the use of only cash payments for the recipients of the Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (Caudill and Mixon, 1993), 
because all the AFDC recipients are automatically eligible for Medicaid and 
categorically qualified for food stamps. Second, because of lack of data for 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) across states, AFDC benefits are measured 
against per capita disposable income so that relative cost of living or living 
standard is taken into consideration. This methodology provides an alterna-
tive to the use of the CPI for major Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) to 
derive real AFDC payments across states (Caudill and Mixon, 1993). Third, 
the habit persistence model is applied to investigate how past AFDC partici-
pation would affect current AFDC participation or how the actual size of 
AFDC recipients adjusts to the desired level. Fourth, the weighted least 
squares (WLS) method is employed to correct for potential heteroscedastici-
ty normally found in the cross sectional data. A number of socio-economic 
variables such as the educational level, the unemployment rate, and the 
divorce rate are considered as well. 
The paper is organized in the following manner. The literature is 
briefly reviewed in the second section with an emphasis on AFDC participa-
tion. The model is described in the third section. Empirical results and 
hypothesis tests are presented and interpreted in the fourth section. A sum-
mary and concluding remarks are made in the last section. 
II. Literature Survey 
Based on the 1980 Census data for many MSAs, Cloutier and Loviscek 
(1989) found that AFDC families increase if the own benefit payment, the 
inter-urban benefit difference ratio, the unemployment rate, and median 
female annual earnings rise, and that poverty among female-headed families 
rises if a metropolitan area is adjacent to a lower benefit payment urban 
area. 
Using the data from 1978 to 1983, Robins (1990) indicated that 
AFDC participation rates declined from 0.40 in 1978 to 0.32 in 1983. He 
attributed the decline to several reasons: decreases in real AFDC guarantee 
amount, changes in demographics, and increases in the effective AFDC 
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benefit reduction rate. However, rising unemployment rates and declining 
real child support collections are expected to raise the participation rate. His 
probit analysis also showed that blacks and separated households have higher 
AFDC participation, whereas increases in years of schooling, numbers of 
children and age will reduce AFDC participation. 
Employing the 1980 data from the National Medical Care Utilization 
and Expenditure Survey, Blank (1989) found that AFDC participation is 
little affected by Medicaid. Winkler (1991) used the 1986 Current Popula-
tion Survey and showed a similar finding that Medicaid does not affect 
AFDC participation and hours worked, but has a small negative impact on 
the decision to work, 
Moffitt (1989) emphasized the importance of non-cash benefits such 
as food stamps in the determination of welfare participation. Moffitt and 
Wolfe (1992) studied welfare participation of female heads and developed 
an index for the family value of Medicaid benefits. The data came from 
the Survey of Income and Program Participation in 1984. They found 
strong evidence that Medicaid increases welfare participation and reduces 
labor supply 2. The impact is greater with those expecting large medical 
expenditure. The negative impact of the availability and funding of private 
health insurance on AFDC participation is more than twice the positive 
effect of the Medicaid program. Other major findings showed that increases 
in age and education will reduce AFDC participation, whereas nonwhites 
have greater participation. 
Gottschalk (1990) found that for whites and blacks, there is a high 
degree of intergenerational correlation of welfare participation. When 
parents were eligible for and participated in AFDC, their daughters had a 
greater probability to have early birth and become AFDC recipients 3. Antel 
(1992) used young girls and their mothers as samples and found that the 
current welfare system stimulates the dependency of future generations and 
that a daughter's welfare dependency is expected to increase with her moth-
er's welfare participation. 
III. The Model 
Based on previous studies and economic theory, the size of AFDC 
recipients can be expressed as: 
2 Note, however, that labor supply can also be reduced owing to illness or handicap which 
requires a larger amount of Medicaid. 
3 This intergenerational correlation can be explained by the difficulty of getting out of the 
poverty "trap". 
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AFDCI = /(BEN, EDU, UNR, INC, DIV, AFDC¿ ,_,) (1) 
+ - + ? + + ' 
where 
AFDC = AFDC families as a percent of total families; 
BEN = AFDC benefits as a percent of per capita disposable income; 
EDU = percent of persons who are high school graduates or higher; 
UNR = the unemployment rate; 
INC = per capita disposable income; 
DIV = the divorce rate; 
i = an individual state. 
The following three types of benefits (BEN) will be considered: 
CASH = cash payments; 
CASHFS = cash payments plus food stamps; 
BENALL = cash payments, food stamps and Medicaid benefits. 
It is expected that AFDC varies positively with BEN, UNR, and DIV, 
but negatively with EDU. As Bassi (1990) pointed out, there are voluntary 
and involuntary AFDC recipients. Increases in involuntary unemployment 
and the population that was eligible for AFDC caused AFDC recipients to 
rise during 1967-79. Thus, the unemployment rate is used to measure how 
difficult it is to find jobs in the labor maket. 
As indicated by Gottschalk (1990) and Antel (1992), there is an inter-
generational correlation of welfare participation between mothers and their 
daughters. To generalize their findings, this may suggest that AFDC 
recipients in the last period (AFDC; T_X) may affect current AFDC re-
cipients (AFDC,) due to the habit persistence model. 
INC measures financial strength of the society to support welfare pro-
grams. Thus, a more affluent society is likely to support more AFDC reci-
pients. On the other hand, INC also measures the degree of poverty. Hence, 
when INC rises, poverty declines, and AFDC recipients are expected to 
decrease. Because of the positive and negative impacts of INC on AFDC, 
the sign of INC is uncertain. 
IV. Empirical Results 
The sample consists of 49 states. The use of states as the sample is 
justified because federal and state governments share the expense of welfare 
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programs. Although data for AFDC recipients in 1991 are available, the 
year of 1990 is chosen because of lack of data for some of the independent 
variables in 1991. AFDC and welfare benefits came from the Social Security 
Bulletin, U.S. Social Security Administration. EDU was taken from the U.S. 
Census of Population, U.S. Bureau of the Census. UNR was obtained from 
the Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment, U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. INC came from the Survey of Current Business, U.S. De-
partment of Commerce. DIV was collected from the Vital Statistics of the 
United States, U.S. National Center for Health Statistics. 
In constructing the data for CASHFS and BENALL, a household size 
of three is assumed. As indicated earlier, all of the AFDC recipients are 
automatically eligible for Medicaid and are categorically qualified for food 
stamps. Because the data for food stamps provided for AFDC recipients are 
not available, it is assumed that all AFDC participants receive food stamps. 
This may be close to the conjecture that the percent of AFDC participants 
who actually receive food stamps is quite high. 
An analysis of the data indicates that annual AFDC cash benefits per 
person varied from a low of $482.04 in Alabama to a high of $2,934.12 in 
Alaska. The amount of food stamps per person also ranged from $495.14 in 
California to $1,051.95 in Hawaii. The annual Medicaid benefit per capita 
differed from $1,354 in Mississippi to $5,423 in New Hampshire. Differ-
ences in these benefits are expected to influence AFDC participation. 
However, we need to note that there are some differences among these 
three benefits. AFDC cash payments provide the most flexible discretionary 
use, food stamps have restricted use, and the Medicaid program is utilized 
intensively or occasionally by AFDC participants, depending upon their 
health conditions. One of the reasons for the differences is due to the cost 
of living. However, the cost of living indexes are only compiled for major 
metropolitan areas, but not for individual states. Thus, AFDC benefits are 
expressed as a percent of per capita disposable income in order to tie 
benefits to the cost of living or living standard. 
Estimated regressions and relevant statistics are presented in Table 1. 
Both regressions were estimated with the weighted least squares method 
assuming the multiplicative heteroscedasticity. In (A), all of the coefficients 
have the expected signs and are significant at the 1% level, except that 
the coefficient of UNR is significant at the 2.5% level. AFDC participation 
will decline if the AFDC monthly benefit/income ratio, the divorce rate, 
the unemployment rate, or per capita disposable income decreases and if 
the educational level increases. The habit persistence model is confirmed 
because the coefficient of AFDCI_1 has a positive and significant sign. 
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TABLE 1 
E S T I M A T E D R E G R E S S I O N S F O R A F D C R E C I P I E N T S A N D 
I T S D E T E R M I N A N T S : 1 9 9 0 







EDU - 0 . 4 0 7 * * - 0 . 3 7 8 * * - 0 . 2 9 9 * * 
( -3 .903) (-3.411) (-3.154) 
UNR 0.046* 0.028 0.024 
(2.023) (1.059) (0.950) 
INC 0.187** 0.225** 0.249** 
(4.786) (5.429) (5.631) 
DIV 0.060** 0.063** 0.100** 
(2.839) (2.796) (3.413) 
AFDCl_l 0.913** 0.920** 0.951** 
(45.890) (44.150) (49.380) 
INT -0 .197 -0 .788 - 1 . 5 3 2 
(-0.439) (-2.068) (-3.696) 
R2 0.984 0.984 0.983 
INT is the intercept. 
Figures in parentheses lare t-ratios. • 
All variables are expressed in the logarithmic scale. 
** means a 1% significance level. 
* means a 2.5% significance level. 
The adjustment coefficient is 0.087, suggesting that it takes quite a while 
for the actual AFDC recipients to adjust to the desired level. There are a 
number of reasons why this may happen. These may be called the recogni-
tion lag, the administrative lag, and the legislative lag. It may take a while 
for potentially eligible persons to understand welfare programs and to apply 
for the benefits. It is also time-consuming for government employees to 
process applications and to evaluate if applicants are eligible for welfare 
benefits. Sometimes, it may take years for the legislative branch to pass 
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welfare reform or changes, because a cut in welfare benefits would be 
politically unpopular among the poor. 
In (B), AFDC cash payments plus food stamps (CASHFS) are treated 
as one variable. We find that its coefficient is significant at the 2 .5% level 
and that the coefficient of UNR is insignificant. Other coefficients are 
significant at the 1 % level. In (C), all of the three benefits (BENALL) are 
considered. Results are similar to those found in (B). Our findings are in 
contrast with Blank (1989) and Winkler (1991) who indicated that Medic-
aid is insignificant at the 5 % level, but are consistent with Moffitt and 
Wolfe (1992) who emphasized that AFDC benefits should include cash, 
food stamps, and Medicaid. The difference between findings huîhis study 
and Moffit and Wolfe (1992) is that we regard all of the benefits astone 
package, whereas they treat individual benefits separately, 
f ..«A, 
V. Conclusions «>;-. ' 
V' o" «I • 
In this paper, the determinants of AFDC recipients a q ^ ^ j 
been examined. Six independent variables are considered 
analysis. We have found that increases in the educational level reduce 
AFDC recipients, whereas increases in monthly AFDC benefits, per capita 
income, the unemployment rate, and the divorce rate cause AFDC recipients 
to rise. The habit persistence model is also confirmed because the behavior 
of AFDC recipients in the past affects that of current AFDC recipients or 
because it takes more than one period for the actual size of AFDC recipients 
to adjust to the desired level. 
There are several policy implications. In some states, AFDC benefits 
may be higher than in other states, thus creating an incentive for existing 
recipients to stay longer or for others to apply for the AFDC program. 
Second, AFDC cash payments, food stamps, and Medicaid are considered. 
No matter which measure of the benefits is used, results are consistent and 
show that an increase in AFDC benefits is expected to raise AFDC participa-
tion. Third, the government needs to emphasize education, reduce dropout 
rates, provide family counseling, and pursue full employment so that AFDC 
recipients may have adequate training and skills and a favorable environment 
to find jobs to become self-sufficient. 
The paper has a number of limitations. Because the data for food 
stamps paid to AFDC recipients are not available, the assumption that all 
AFDC recipients receive food stamps may overestimate the actual value. 
Because of the use of state data, individual characters are not considered in 
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the regressions. Benefits received by AFDC recipients are not separated due 
to a high degree of multicollinearity. 
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PERSISTENZA DELL'ABITUDINE, MISURE DEI BENEFICI E DETERMI-
NANTI DELLA PARTECIPAZIONE ALL'ASSISTENZA SOCIALE 
Questo articolo estende i lavori di Moffitt e Wolfe (1992), Blank (1989), 
Winkler (1991), Caudill e Mixon (1993) e altri ed esamina, per un campione di 
49 stati nel 1990, l'impatto della partecipazione in passato all'assistenza sociale, 
di differenti misure dei benefici e di altre variabili socio-economiche sulla parte-
cipazione all'assistenza sociale. I risultati sono un poco diversi da quelli ottenuti 
da Blank e Winkler. I risultati più importanti mostrano che esiste una persistenza 
dell'abitudine, che è opportuna una più ampia misura dei benefici (aiuti alle 
famiglie con minori) e che la partecipazione a questi aiuti diminuisce con 
l'aumento del livello di istruzione e del reddito personale procapite, e aumenta 
con più elevati tassi di divorzio. 
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E N V I R O N M E N T A L P O L I C Y 
by 
ALAIN V E R B E R E * a n d CHRIS COECK * * 
1. Introduction 
The conventional academic literature on environmental economics is 
largely based upon the concept of externalities. As Wijkander (1985, p. 
I l l ) states: "Externalities can be conceived as unpriced by-products of (or 
inputs to) producer or consumer activities". 
In the presence of environmental costs, conventional economic theory 
suggests that a rational solution to this problem may be to levy a tax equal 
to the costs generated by the negative external effects, see Pigou (1920), 
Böhm and Russel (1985), Baumol and Oates (1988), OECD (1989), Helm 
and Pearce (1990), Tietenberg (1990a, 1990b), and Andersen (1992). 
Figure 1 visualises the effect of internalizing the external costs into the 
private production cost function. Production is reduced from Q 1 to Q 2, as 
a result of a shift in the supply curve. Alternatively, this conventional 
approach also allows for a subsidy to be allocated to the party suffering 
from the negative environmental effect or to the polluting actor in order to 
stimulate the use of a more environment friendly production technology. 
Given the costs that are often associated with measuring actual exter-
nal effects, economic rationality, in terms of welfare maximizing behaviour, 
suggests that the tax (T) (which is intended to internalize the external 
effect) should be equal for each unit of production, see Figure 2. 
In other words, in practice it is mostly not possible to implement the 
* Free University of Brussels (VUB), Faculty of Economics, Brussels (Belgium). 
* * National Foundation of Scientific Research (NFWO), University Centre of Antwerp 
(RUCA), Faculty of Applied Economics, Antwerp (Belgium). 
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FIGURE 1: Internalization of external costs into the market mechanism 
FIGURE 2: Pigou type taxation in the presence of environmental costs 
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"polluter pays"-principle in terms of levying a tax exactly equal to the 
marginal environmental costs associated with a marginal change in the level 
of production by a specific economic actor. For example, a uniform tax on 
the purchase of each unit of leaded gas does not take into account the 
technology of the car engine (which may lead to a higher or lower level of 
pollution), nor the place of pollution (such as a heavily congested and 
polluted city versus a non-congested and non-polluted country side). This 
implies that some economic actors will actually pay too much and others too 
little, because the only visible and easily measurable attribute of polluting 
behaviour in this case is the use of gas as an input. Similarly, taxes could be 
levied on the purchase or use of sport cars or cars with a large engine, given 
the expectation that drivers of such cars are intrinsically heavier polluters 
than drivers of family cars. In practice, some owners or users of the former 
category of cars may actually be very careful occasional drivers whereas some 
owners or users of the latter may be generators of much higher negative 
external effects in terms of noise, toxic emissions, etc. 
In the simple cases mentioned above, the incorrect allocation of taxes 
to particular economic actors may not matter very much, as long as, overall, 
taxes compensate for the negative external effects associated with private 
road transportation. However, in the case of industrial pollution, various 
other elements may make environmental decision making by public policy 
makers much more complex. They include: 
1. The possible contradiction between financial (tax income) and 
behavioural (reduction in polluting behaviour) public policy goals; 
2. The possible absence of adequate information on the potential 
effectiveness of alternative public policy regulatory approaches and on the 
possible interaction among various measures; 
3. The possible absence of perceived legitimacy of specific policies 
(impact on voting behaviour); 
4. The possible absence of sufficient administrative capabilities to 
implement specific policies (low level of technical know-how in public 
agencies responsible for administering an environmental programme); 
5. The absence of knowledge on the constraints faced by the managers 
and owners of firms confronted with the regulatory requirement to reduce 
pollution and/or pay environmental taxes. These constraints may be related 
to the firms' competitive position vis-à-vis foreign rivals subject to different 
regulations or to the lack of technological know-how that could reduce 
pollution. 
The presence of the five elements above implies that the main public 
policy problem shifts from the simple "academic" measurement of the social 
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costs of pollution and the welfare maximizing choice of the best tool to 
internalize these social costs, toward a much more difficult set of questions 
to be solved by public policy makers. Here, we are confronted with a policy 
formation process in which multiple actors are involved and where uncer-
tainty and complexity make the relatively easy "welfare maximizing how-to-
do -it -prescriptions on assessing environmental damage the equivalent of 
the first hundred meters of a marathon. 
In fact, both the formation of environmental policy and the extent to 
which economic efficiency is actually achieved through such a policy can be 
largely described in terms of the concepts "bounded rationality" and "oppor-
tunism" as defined by Williamson (1975, 1985). Bounded rationality re-
flects the fact that economic actors are hampered in their decisions by 
inadequate or incomplete information. Instead of the intended rational ac-
tion, a suboptimal decision is made based on incomplete information: the 
rationality of policy makers is "bounded". With bounded rationality, econo-
mic actors "experience limits in formulating and solving complex problems 
and in processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) information", 
see Williamson (1975, 1981, p. 1545 and 1985) \ Opportunism refers to 
"self-interest seeking (with guile)", i.e. cheating behaviour resulting from 
information asymmetries, see Williamson (1981, p. 1545). 
In other words, the properties of each environmental policy, including 
the mix of measures used, the administrative system set up to enforce them, 
the presence of sanctioning machanisms (penalties for firms that do not 
respect environmental regulations), the impact of the affected business firms 
on the policy process and outcome, etc., can all be translated in terms of the 
extent to which they help economizing on bounded rationality and alleviat-
ing problems of opportunism. A comparative institutional assessment of 
real world environmental policy alternatives will then allow to optimize 
an existing system: attributes that could reduce problems of bounded ra-
tionality and opportunism should be introduced, attributes that generate 
such problems or do not contribute to solving them should be replaced 
by others. 
The rational choice of a specific environmental policy would then be a 
1 Although the concept of bounded rationality is credited to H. Simon, Williamson's 
analysis of this factor is somewhat different. In Simon's view, economic actors do not pursue 
maximization but try to obtain acceptable minima instead, see HODGSON (1993, p. 11). In 
contrast, Williamson's concept of bounded rationality refers to cost-minimizing, or welfare 
maximizing behaviour given a variety of information constraints. Williamson therefore does not 
share the view of the "behavioural school" and has obviously been more influenced by the 
neoclassical maximization assumption in his analysis. 
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choice guided by the willingness to reduce problems of bounded rationality 
and opportunism, through altering particular attributes of existing policies, 
taking into account specific public policy goals. This approach is used in the 
remainder of this paper, through an application to environmental policy in 
Belgium (Flanders area). In the next section, a new conceptual model is 
developed to assess the economic efficiency properties of alternative environ-
mental policy measures. In the third section, the relevance of this model is 
discussed through a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the impact 
of existing and expected environmental policy measures in Belgium. In 
the fourth section, the results of in-depth interviews carried out with 
managers of 15 firms subject to the present economic regulation in Belgium 
are used to gain further insights into the efficiency properties of the existing 
environmental policy system and possible alternative approaches. 
2. Economic Efficiency of Environmental Policy 
At least four main sets of actors are involved in environmental policy 
aimed at regulating industrial pollution: politicians (who formulate policies), 
bureaucrats (public agencies responsible for the implementation of policies), 
firms (which are affected by environmental policy measures) and society at 
large (which should benefit from the environmental policy measures). 
Important bounded rationality and opportunism problems may arise 
during the environmental policy formation process. As regards bounded 
rationality, politicians may not have adequate information concerning all the 
effects associated with implementing specific measures, neither from admin-
istering agencies nor from the affected business firms' point of view. In 
addition, they may also lack information as regards the extent to which 
specific policy measures will be considered as legitimate both by the actors 
benefiting from the measures (i.e., the voters) and the actors affected by 
these measures (i.e., the business firms engaged in polluting behaviour). 
This legitimacy-issue has important implications for the actual efficiency of 
environmental policy measures, as will be explained below. Fundamentally, 
the bounded rationality problem is related to a lack of information on the 
potential efficiency of specific measures as compared to other ones, assum-
ing that no serious problems of legitimacy, administrative implementation 
or business level implementation occur. 
Opportunism may also have a major impact on the efficiency of specif-
ic policy measures. Politicians may select particular policy measures, merely 
to pursue their own goals rather than societal goals. For example, purely 
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financial objectives may be pursued aimed at raising general income for 
government through environmental taxes. Alternatively, specific measures 
with a high public visibility may be introduced in order to increase votes, 
not to optimize pollution levels. Polluting firms and public agencies responsi-
ble for implementing environmental policy measures may also engage in 
cheating behaviour. For example, the former may attempt to disguise real 
pollution levels. The latter may engage in an insufficient or too rigid enforce-
ment of environmental measures in the pursuit of their own goals, thereby 
even stimulating opportunistic behaviour by business firms. 
Given the problems of bounded rationality and opportunism described 
above, economic rationality in environmental policy obviously entails the 
selection of policy measures that have a high potential effectiveness in terms 
of contributing to environmental policy goals, but also requires the design of 
a decision making structure (and process), which allows to economize on 
bounded rationality and prevent opportunistic behaviour of the various 
actors involved. A difficult issue is undoubtedly the problem of reducing 
the propensity of politicians to behave opportunistically. After all, it may 
be perfectly rational for them, not to pursue a reduction of excessive pollu-
tion levels but to levy environmental taxes for mere financing reasons. 
In other words, the actors responsible for the choice of an institutional 
framework, within which environmental policy measures will be applied, 
may actually make choices that are not optimal from an economic efficiency 
point of view. Here, politically efficient policy outcomes are preferred over 
outcomes that are efficient from an economic perspective. This practical 
problem for policy analysis, which is discussed in North (1981, 1990), will 
not be dealt with in this paper. We assume that politicians at least to some 
extent are driven by the intent to achieve outcomes that are efficient from 
an economic rather than à political point of view, in the realm of environ-
mental policy. This view seems reasonable to the extent that the voters 
themselves often voice preferences in favour of environmental policy deci-
sions that are efficient from an economic perspective. The main rational 
choice problem then becomes one of choosing an institutional setting with 
attributes that contribute as much as possible to environmental policy goals, 
through a reduction of bounded rationality and opportunism problems faced 
by politicians. 
Baumol and Oates (1979, p. 232) established a classification of various 
environmental policy measures according to several criteria, but did not 
solve the problem of optimal institutional choice. Baumol and Oates used a 
classification of policy instruments according to eight criteria, i.e. (1) de-
pendability, (2) permanence, (3) adaptability, (4) incentives for maximum 
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effort, (5) economy, (6) political attractiveness, (7) minimal interference 
with private decisions and (8) equity 2. 
In our view, only four criteria are important to assess alternative struc-
tures for environmental policy from a comparative institutional point of 
view, namely: 
1. Potential economic efficiency, which requires knowledge on the 
differential contribution of each possible regulatory system to public policy 
goals (in terms of either the "polluter pays"-principle or the goal of reducing 
pollution to a socially acceptable level), weighted against the implementa-
tion costs. Here, it is assumed that no problems of bounded rationality or 
opportunism exist in terms of social legitimacy (especially vis-à-vis polluting 
firms) of the regulatory system, the administrative implementation and the 
business level of implementation. 
All criteria of Baumol and Oates (1979), except the last one could be 
viewed as components of this potential economic efficiency criterion. 
2. The social legitimacy of the regulatory system, which is required 
to avoid opportunistic behaviour by firms. Specifically, social legitimacy will 
be absent if polluting firms perceive that the environmental taxes they pay 
to government are used for purposes unrelated to environmental policy. 
Institutional elements which may stimulate social legitimacy include trans-
parent environmental tax income/expenditures accounts and tax exemptions 
for firms that engage in pollution reducing investments. This parameter 
includes the equity criterion of Baumol and Oates (1979). 
3. The difficulties of administrative implementation, which may 
result from agency problems in bureaucratic organisation or from the lack 
2 Baumol and Oates define the set of criteria more in detail as: 
1. dependability, describes the reliability of the approach to achieve its objectives. 
2. permanence-, evaluates the effectiveness of the environmental program when it captures 
public interest and also when the attention of the media and the public weakens. 
3. adaptability to economic growth: describes the possibility for the environmental pro-
gram to be flexible enough to adapt to normal expansion in economic activities and population 
growth. 
4. incentives for maximum effort-, evaluates to what extent incentives are offered by the 
program to individuals or enterprises, to minimize environmental damage. 
5. economy: investigates whether the program achieves its results at relatively low costs to 
society. 
6. political attractiveness: evaluates the usefulness of the method for legislators and voters. 
7. minimal interference with private decisions: answers the question whether the method 
prescribes exactly what to do or whether it offers a broad tange of choices consistent with the 
protection of the environment. 
8. equity: suggests that the financial burden should be fairly divided between individuals 
and enterprises. 
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FIGURE 3: Efficiency analysis of environmental policy 
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of resources and capabilities to effectively implement specific measures. 
4. The difficulties of implementation at the firm level, including 
financial and technological problems associated with implementing specific 
policies, as well as negative spill-overs on the affected firms' competitive 
position vis-à-vis international rivals subject to a different regulatory regime. 
Figure 3 describes the required components for an efficient environ-
mental policy as suggested above. 
In the next section, a quantitative model is developed, which attempts 
to assess the economic efficiency of environmental taxes on industrial pollu-
tion in Belgium, with a focus on the issue of social legitimacy and problems 
of firm level implementation. 
3. Environmental Policy in Belgium - Flemish Region 
Environmental taxes on industrial pollution are widely regarded as 
environmental measures with a high potential economic efficiency, as sug-
gested by a substantial body of economic literature and by a number of 
empirical studies 3. 
In Belgium, environmental taxes are levied at the regional level. The 
present system of taxation on water pollution in the Flemish region was 
introduced in 1990 and mainly aims at reducing existing levels of water 
pollution. The income resulting from taxes on water pollution is allocated to 
the so-called MINA-fund (Fund for pollution prevention and restoration of 
nature and environment), and is used entirely for financing a variety of 
environmental policies. 
Taxes on other (non-water) industrial pollution have existed since 
1986. Here too, these taxes are intended to reduce polluting behaviour and 
to finance government policies in this area. 
Given that the government's main policy goal is to reduce pollution 
levels through taxes on pollution which undoubtedly have a high potential 
efficiency, as compared to other types of instruments, the question arises as 
to the actual realized efficiency of these taxes, especially as regards their 
legitimacy perceived by firms and the extent to which they have led to a 
reduction of pollution as compared to the situation before the present taxa-
tion system was introduced. 
A sample of 383 firms, responsible for more than 80% of industrial 
water pollution and a sample of 448 firms representing more than 8 5 % of 
3 S e e e .g. DEWEES ( 1 9 8 3 ) , BAUMOL and OATES ( 1 9 8 8 ) and HAHN ( 1 9 8 9 ) . 
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other (non water) industrial pollution in the Flemish region were selected 
for an investigation about the legitimacy and business level implementation 
effects of environmental taxes (see S'Jegers et al., 1993). 
The model used to measure the effectiveness of environmental taxes 
was based on existing empirical studies, i.e. Bressers (1983 and 1988) and 
Schuurman (1988). These two authors consider the system of environmental 
taxation of polluted water in the Netherlands as a linear function. The 
different relevant variables therefore can be estimated by means of multiple 
linear regression. 
The original analysis of Bressers was based on a survey of 40 regional 
Dutch Sewage Boards, that are responsible for monitoring water quality in 
the Netherlands. 
Schuurman investigated the evolution of pollution levels, based on a 
survey of 104 heavily polluting industrial companies. The results of both 
authors indicate that the regulatory effect of Dutch water charges in the past 
was considerable. 
The responses to our survey lead to the application of quantitative 
models to 128 firms for water pollution (for the period 1990-1992) and 63 
firms for other (non-water related) pollution (period 1989-1992), that had 
correcdy and completely filled in a questionnaire on environmental policy. 
After a general identification of the firm, company specific pollution 
data had to be supplied. More specifically, the behavioural analysis focused 
on the actions taken to reduce pollution and the implementation problems 
associated with these actions. A number of questions were also asked on the 
possible impact of environmental taxation on the firm's (international) 
competitive position. 
An analysis of the responses to the questionnaire led to the conclusion 
that environmental taxes in the Flemish region at present do not have any 
positive impact on pollution reduction. This result was confirmed by empiri-
cal models (case studies on polluted water and non-water related pollution). 
These models are shown below. 
In the case of water pollution, the following equation was determined 
by multiple linear regression (standard deviations are indicated between 
brackets): 
REPOL = - 340.85 +165.77 LT+5 .25 10~5 AEC+47.51 REPROD 
(528.28) (34.89) (5.48 10~6) (69.92) 
with: REPOL = relative evolution of pollution levels 
LT = level of taxation 
AEC = mean elimination- or treatment costs 
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REPROD = relative evolution of production. 
These variables can be defined in detail as: 
REPOL — P°^u t 'o n v ° l u m e year x - pollution volume year (x — n) 
pollution volume year (x — «) 
average volume of pollution • tariff _ average level of taxation 
average production value average production value 
AEC = average elimination costs, when eliminating industrial pollution by 
entrepreneurial in-house management 
REPROD= production value year x — production value year (x — n) 
production value year (x — n) 
+ 1 
After carrying out a multiple regression analysis on the survey-data, 
multiple R attains 0.68 and R2 0.46. This result implies that approximately 
5 0 % of the variation in pollution levels is described by the chosen var-
iables. 
If a stepwise-regression is carried out, only the level of taxation and 
the mean costs of elimination are significant. In this case R2 attains 0.46 and 
the multiple R is 0.68. 
In the equation it is remarkable, and even surprising, that the taxation 
level parameter has a positive sign rather than a negative one which seems 
to imply that higher levels of taxation are correlated with higher levels of 
relative pollution. 
In the case of non-water pollution, the equation can be determined as 
follows: 
REPOL = - 0 . 7 9 5 + 3.699 LT+1.056 10"10 AEC- 0.209 REPROD 
(4.055) (0.456) (5.079 10"8) (1.154) 
The multiple R attains 0.72, whereas R2 is 0.52. If a stepwise multiple 
regression is carried out, only the level of taxation remains a significant 
variable. Here too, higher taxation levels would appear to be associated 
with increases in relative pollution levels. 
A summary of the different variables in each equation, /-statistics, R2, 
standard deviations and the results of the Durbin-Watson test are provided 
in Table 1. 
Hence, in the Flemish region of Belgium, it can be observed that the 
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TABLE 1 : SUMMARY TABLE 
Water pollution 
Variables B SE T Signif. T 
LT 165.77 34.89 4.751 0.000 (*) 
AEC 5.25 IO'5 5.48 IO"6 9.591 0.000 (*) 
REPROD 47.51 69.92 0.679 0.498 
Constant -340.85 528.28 -0.645 0.520 
(*) : variables remaining significant after regression-analysis 
Multiple R : 0.68 
R2 0.46 
F : 35.9 
Signif. F : 0.00 
D-W test : 2.02 
Non-water pollution 
Variables B SE T Signif. T 
LT 3.67 0.46 8.043 0.000 (*) 
AEC 1.06 1010 5.08 IO"8 0.002 0.998 
REPROD -0.21 1.15 -0.181 0.857 
Constant -0.79 4.06 -0.196 0.845 











assumption of high tax-rates directly resulting in a reduction of pollution is 
unsupported by empirical evidence. 
In 1990, taxation levels were increased substantially (for example the 
charges for a number of sectors were doubled or even tripled). Nevertheless, 
an analysis of the data for the 1990-1993 period indicated that no substan-
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tial differences existed between pollution figures prior to 1990 and those 
occurring after 1990. 
The absence of the expected behavioural impact of environmental 
taxes in terms of reduction of polluting behaviour could be partly explained 
by the time required to implement pollution reduction strategies and by a 
level of taxation which could be too low to induce changes in behaviour. 
However, the questionnaire also contained questions regarding future 
behaviour, more specifically on expected changes in pollution levels (less 
than 25%, between 25 and 50%, between 50 and 7 5 % and between 75 
and 100%) in the case of tax increases with 100% and 500%. A wide 
majority of firms did not even provide an answer to these questions, thus 
indicating that the present system of environmental taxes is not perceived 
as a legitimate instrument to alter pollution levels 4. Firms do not perceive 
the present system as one meant to create a switch from polluting to 
non-polluting behaviour but they consider it primarily as a tool to raise funds 
for government. In fact, uncertainty about the evolution of the level of 
environmental taxes was even perceived as a factor hindering investments 
in polluting reduction by 4 6 % of the firms in the case of water pollution 
and 3 4 % in the case of non-water pollution. 
The question then arises what changes in government policy could be 
introduced in order to improve the firm level impact of environmental 
policy. It is clear that government was rational in terms of selecting a policy 
instrument with a superior potential efficiency as compared to direct regula-
tion (setting of maximum pollution levels), but somehow it is faced with a 
major information problem, given the absence of realized efficiency as re-
gards actual levels of reduction in pollution. The problem of opportunism 
by business firms appears to have been an issue of lesser importance, as 
even in-depth interviews conducted with managers of the affected firms did 
not indicate that cheating behaviour took place on a large scale. For 
example, in the case of water pollution, inspections by the public agency 
responsible for measuring pollution levels often take place unannounced so 
that the possibility of artificially reducing pollution levels during the short 
periods of official measurement (through shifts in the product mix from 
heavily polluting products to products with a lower pollution level) is 
reduced. In this context, it should be recognized, however, that if the 
present system was altered to allow for extensive self regulation by firms, 
an increase in levels of opportunistic behaviour could be expected. 
4 These results should obviously be interpreted with caution because firm managers have 
an incentive to state that future behaviour will not be altered by taxes in order to obtain tax 
reductions. 
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In our view, the bounded rationality problems faced by the govern-
ment in the area of creating legitimacy of environmental taxes can be related 
to an insufficient understanding of the necessity to transfer information to 
firms on the actual objective of levying environmental taxes. It may also be 
related to a lack of understanding of the present perception by business 
firms that the private sector is not sufficiently involved in the design of 
environmental programmes and that environmental taxes are not spent effec-
tively by the government. 
A rational government, interested in programme outcomes rather than 
in the selection of policy tools which are allegedly superior as compared to 
other tools, should develop programme attributes that can alleviate such 
problems. In fact, dual information asymmetries need to be eliminated. 
The government needs to receive information on how to improve the pro-
gramme's legitimacy in the eyes of the affected business firms, whereas 
these firms need to be informed more extensively on the purposes of the 
environmental policy and planned changes in this policy. 
A major problem may still arise in the realm of firm level implementa-
tion, even if environmental policy measures are viewed as legitimate. Econo-
mic efficiency can only be achieved if technological possibilities exist to 
reduce pollution levels or if no negative spill-overs result from taxation (a 
loss of value added in the domestic economy, because of a negative impact 
on a domestic operator's competitive position vis-à-vis international rivals 
or foreign operations of the same firm). 
These issues are dealt with in more depth in the next section. 
4. Solving Bounded Rationality Problems in Environmental Policy 
In-depth interviews were held with managers of fifteen companies, all 
large polluting companies in the Flemish region of Belgium, to ask their 
opinion on possible problems of legitimacy and firm-level implementation of 
environmental policy 
Each of these firms agreed with the "the polluter should pay "-principle, 
indicating that the concept of environmental taxes in itself is viewed as 
legitimate. However, the legitimacy of the actual environmental taxation 
' These fifteen firms are Bayer and Rhône-Poulenc (chemical sector), UCO Sportswear, 
Imperial Tufting and Sofinal (textiles), VPK Oudegem (paper), Union Minière (nonferrous 
metals), Union Belgium, General Biscuits, Tiense Suikerraffinaderij and Continental Foods 
(food processing), Volvo Cars and Trucks Europe (automobiles), Animalia (agriculture) and 
Electrabel (electricity). 
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system was considered to be very low, because the government at present 
does not permit sufficient input in policy formation from the affected 
business firms. In fact, fourteen of the fifteen firms argued that the input 
from the business community should be drastically increased. 
First, firms should be allowed to submit individual files on the ex-
pected impact of planned changes in the environmental taxation system, so 
that the government would at least be informed on the firm level impact of 
specific policy measures. Rational politicians should thus find out how 
planned policy changes are perceived by firms. This information would not 
necessarily be valuable in terms of altering proposed government measures, 
but would create legitimacy in the eyes of firms, because the government 
would know in advance what the impact of specific measures would be. 
However, in no case should the submission of individual company files 
automatically lead to an exemption from the environmental taxes, i.e. an 
implicit subsidy, benefiting the firm facing severe competition. The cost of 
such a subsidy would obviously be borne by society at large. The submitted 
information should simply provide in-depth knowledge to public policy 
makers on the firm-level implications of (intended) policy actions. 
Second, politicians should also recognize that managers and owners of 
firms, faced with bounded rationality problems themselves, have a prefer-
ence for uncertainty reduction through knowledge on the future evolution 
of environmental policy, such as the magnitude of environmental taxes. 
Hence, the development and publication of a long term plan on environ-
mental policy would also increase the legitimacy of such a plan because of 
uncertainty reduction for business firms. 
Third, the legitimacy of environmental policy can be increased by the 
introduction of a public monitoring capability that would assess environmen-
tal policies and more specifically the level of environmental taxes in impor-
tant trading partners of Belgium (i.e. France, Germany, the Netherlands) so 
that measures taken in the Flemish region could always be compared with 
measures abroad. 
This last issue is also related to the problems of firm level implementa-
tion, as visualized in Figure 4 on the conceptual basis for a differentiated 
taxation system. Quadrant 1 of Figure 4 reflects the existence of firms 
which do not have access to technological capabilities that would allow to 
reduce pollution levels. In addition, environmental taxes have an important 
negative impact on their competitive position. Although the government 
should not necessarily alter its environmental policies to accommodate the 
firms in this quadrant, it should at least recognize that the implementation 
of the "polluter should pay"-principle may lead to negative spill-over effects 
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FIGURE 4: Conceptual basis for a differentiated environmental taxation system 
in terms of losses of value added because of the unfavourable effects on the 
affected firms' competitive position. Here, economic efficiency considera-
tions could suggest that the taxation system should be adapted to the system 
prevailing in representative trading partners or nations. 
In other words, the government could reduce its own bounded ra-
tionality problems on the possible negative effects of environmental taxes 
and thus on the overall efficiency to be expected of such taxes by, e.g., 
introducing a "ceiling" on taxes, in accordance with the strongest taxation 
levels prevailing in other relevant nations. 
Firms in the second quadrant cannot change their pollution levels 
either, but do not undergo any major negative impact of the taxation levels 
on their competitive position. Here, the government should find out what 
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part of the total population of firms fits into this quadrant where economic 
efficiency may be achieved in terms of the "polluter should pay"-principle, 
but not in terms of reducing existing pollution levels. 
Companies in the third quadrant have access to important pollution 
reduction capabilities, but may undergo a major negative impact on their 
competitive position as a result of environmental taxes. Although the level 
of reduction of environmental pollution may in principle be very high, given 
that firms in this quadrant can be expected to explicitly weigh the payment 
of taxes against the costs of pollution reducing investments, the comment 
made above on the requirement for a "ceiling" is valid here too. 
Finally, the fourth quadrant reflects the presence of firms with ample 
possibilities of reducing pollution and which will not be negatively affected 
by environmental taxes in terms of competitive position. Here again, the 
"polluter should pay"-principle may be successfully implemented, but no 
substantial investments in pollution reduction should be expected. 
The observations made above demonstrate that it is very important for 
the government to develop insights into firm level implementation problems 
resulting from an environmental policy based on pollution taxes. 
First, the government should become informed on the possible nega-
tive effects of such taxes on the affected firms' competitive position. These 
negative effects can be largely avoided by placing a relevant "ceiling" on 
environmental taxes. The bounded rationality problems faced by the gov-
ernment in this area refer to acquiring sufficient information to determine 
what an adequate ceiling is. 
Second, the government should recognize that for a substantial number 
of firms, a reduction of pollution levels is not a viable, technical possibility, 
so that economic efficiency, if defined in terms of an actual reduction of 
pollution levels, may not be achieved. 
5. Conclusion 
The analysis above has suggested that economic rationality in environ-
mental policy requires a recognition of the fact that policy measures are not 
taken in a social vacuum: they are introduced within a complex network of 
social, political and economic interactions among different sets of actors. It 
could be argued that politicians face important costs when attempting to 
gather information that would lead to more efficient outcomes of environ-
mental policy. However, given these informational costs, politicians are still 
able to order their alternative goals, values, tastes and strategies and choose 
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from available alternatives to maximize their utility. If it is then observed 
that outcomes are not consistent with a present goal (environmental taxes 
do not lead to a substantial decrease of pollution), this could be explained as 
the logical result of a difference between substantive rationality or posited 
preferences, as found in official policy documents or policy statements and 
procedural rationality or revealed preferences, in which neither goals nor 
outcomes are specified in advance (see Riker, 1990). 
If procedural rationality is assumed, no inconsistency occurs, as the 
choice of a particular set of environmental policy measures and all the 
structural attributes associated with this policy reflect preferences which can 
be inferred backward from the outcomes. In our view this is a simplistic 
approach of reality. One can undoubtedly find examples of policies and 
policy outcomes which are inconsistent with substantive rationality, merely 
because of absolute information costs or the dissimulation of goals by public 
policy makers. However, there are undoubtedly just as many examples of 
cases where public policy makers actually do have a preference for more 
efficient outcomes, but need to learn about the institutional requirements to 
achieve a higher economic efficiency. For example, if public policy makers 
can be taught (at a very low cost, given that information is a public good) 
that outcomes of existing environmental policies can be greatly improved 
through a focus on solving bounded rationality and opportunism problems 
in the areas of legitimacy, administrative implementation and firm level 
implementation, could it then not be argued that politicians who use this 
learning in practice are more substantively rational than those who do not? 
Substantive economic rationality is not just a matter of choosing policy 
instruments such as taxes (as opposed to minimum norms to be respected) 
because economic theory would suggest the superiority of these instruments 
and empirical studies would have demonstrated their success abroad. Mak-
ing a public policy process and structure consistent with policy goals, by 
explicitly assessing the properties of alternative attributes in terms of their 
contribution to overcoming problems of bounded rationality and opportun-
ism appears to be the rational road to follow. 
A final important question is then whether politicians who are able to 
improve the outcomes of environmental policy will necessarily be rewarded 
in terms of re-election. After all, they contributed to the provision of an 
important public good. v 
First, it should be recognized that ideological views transmitted 
through the media could provide distorted information to the public at large 
on the actual efficiency outcomes of environmental policy, but such views 
will mostly not dominate if clear cause-effect relationships between specific 
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policies and outcomes exist. In this case, the introduction of more desirable 
public policy attributes meant to ameliorate bounded rationality and oppor-
tunism problems, should also improve knowledge about cause-effect relation-
ships in environmental policy. 
Second, the major problem faced by politicians providing public goods 
such as a cleaner environment, is that the value of these public goods cannot 
be measured in a straightforward, unambiguous fashion. In other words, it 
is difficult for politicians to market the efficiency of their policies toward 
the public at large, if this efficiency is difficult to measure. 
Third, in the area of environmental policy, the government has a 
monopoly in establishing regulatory measures meant to reduce pollution. 
Hence, voters have no way of knowing how efficient a policy actually 
is. Environmental policies abroad do not necessarily constitute a good 
benchmark for efficiency comparisons given obvious differences in social, 
political and economic settings. This bounded rationality problem faced by 
politicians on how voters will react to specific environmental policies, given 
the information (bounded rationality) problems faced by the voters them-
selves, perhaps also merits an investigation on how to set up information 
disseminating devices to correctly inform the public on the actual economic 
efficiency of environmental policy. After all, politicians interested in substan-
tively rational environmental policies would not be rational if they did not 
have a preference for the transfer of correct information to voters on the 
improvements achieved in the outcomes of environmental policy. 
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NOTA SULLA RAZIONALITÀ ECONOMICA NELLA POLITICA AM-
BIENTALE 
La letteratura convenzionale sull'economia ambientale suggerisce che si im-
pongano tasse nel caso di costi ambientali e che queste tasse costituiscano lo 
strumento ottimale per realizzare il principio « chi inquina paghi ». Questo arti-
colo mostra che molti altri elementi determinano l'efficacia della politica ambien-
tale. In particolare vengono identificati quattro elementi che influenzano la reale 
efficacia della politica ambientale da un punto di vista istituzionale comparato. 
Inoltre, in base allo studio di un caso di imposte ambientali in Belgio, è stato co-
struito uno schema concettuale per un sistema di tassazione ambientale differen-
ziato. 
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by 
LUCA LAMBERTINI * 
1. Introduction 
The literature tackling the issue of horizontal differentiation stems from 
Hotelling's duopoly (1929), in which the hypothesis of linear transportation 
costs led to the so called minimum differentiation principle; the Bertrand 
paradox implicit in this result was given a solution by assuming quadratic 
transportation costs (D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979). The aim 
of this short note is to investigate the behaviour of a monopolist in a 
horizontally differentiated market, i.e., to identify both her optimal location 
choice and her optimal pricing rule in the standard quadratic transportation 
cost framework, in the absence of any entry threat and assuming that she 
can open at most two stores. 
2. The Model 
Our starting point is the model of horizontal differentiation adopted by 
D'Aspremont et al. (1979). The monopolist initially faces the perspective of 
opening two stores, selling the same physical good in both. Assume consum-
ers be uniformly distributed along an interval that, without loss of generali-
ty, can be assumed of length 1 (a "linear city", or Hotelling's beach), with 
total density equal to 1. Consumers have unit demands, and consumption 
yields a positive constant gross surplus 5; then each consumer buys if and 
only if the following condition is satisfied: 
* Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università degli Studi di Bologna, Bologna (Italy), 
and Linacre College, Oxford (United Kingdom). 
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U = S - tX2 - P i > 0, 0 < x < 1, / > 0, i = 1, 2 (1) 
i.e., if the net utility derived from consumption is non-negative; tx2 is the 
transportation cost incurred by a consumer living at distance x from store 
/; pi is the price charged by the monopolist for the good being sold at store 
i. Store 1 is located at point a > 0 and store 2 at point 1 - b > a. 
Assume first that the gross surplus Í is large enough and the trasporta-
tion cost rate t small enough for the market to be completely served by a 
single store monopolist. The demand functions for each of the two goods 
(or stores) are then 
yi = a + + P2-P1 _ (2) 
2 2 t ( l - a - b ) ' 
y 2 = l - y 1 = b+ + Pi -P2 (3) 
2 2 / (1 - a - b) 
respectively, for a < 1 - b. Functions (2) and (3) are not determined for 
a = 1 - b\ in such a case, though, total demand may be provisionally 
thought as being equal to one. Unit production costs are assumed to be 
constant and can be normalized to zero without loss of generality. In the 
absence of entry threat, the objective of the monopolist is then 1 
max tcm = pxyx + if a < 1 - b (4) 
a, b, pi 2 
max TCM = p if A = I - b (4') 
As can be verified by inspection of the first order conditions, the 
maximum problem defined by (4-4') has no inner solution, whereas, since 
the objective function is upper hemi-continuous, it has a border solution 
along a — 1 - b. This amounts to saying that the monopolist is indifferent 
between differentiating or not, so that she may build up a single store As 
pointed out by Tiróle (1988, p. 282), a social planner would choose 
a - b ~ 1/4, since she aims at minimizing the trasportation cost incurred 
by consumers. Then, as a first conclusion, we may say that the product 
variety offered by a single store private monopolist is clearly socially 
suboptimal. The opposite conclusion holds for a duopoly, as it is well 
known (D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Neven, 1985- Econo-
mides, 1986). 
1 The analysis of the monopolist's behaviour when further entries are considered is in 
BONANNO ( 1 9 8 7 ) and HARTER ( 1 9 9 3 ) . 
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Yet, the objective function (4') is everywhere increasing in p; 
moreover, it doesn't convey any information on the optimal location. 
Consequently, in order to identify an economically meaningful solution, we 
must resort to an alternative formulation, tackling both the case of full 
coverage and that of partial coverage of the market. Let us simply denote 
the location by a; obviously, given the symmetry of the problem, we 
1 
imagine 0 < a < - . Since condition (1) must be satisfied, the highest price 
the monopolist can charge is 
pM = y - tx2, => X < (5) 
while the profit function is 
nM = (s - tx2) y (6) 
Notice that both a price-effect and a quantity-effect are present, of 
opposite sign. The demand function can be defined as y = ƒ(*) , with 
f{x) = 2x V x e [0, a] (7) 
f (x) = x + a V x e [a, 1 - a] (8) 
f(x) = iVx e [1 - a, 1] (9) 
When demand is defined as in (8), the monopolist is better off setting 
a — x, for a given price, so that we can confine ourselves to the demand 
functions described by (7) and (9). Furthermore, under both full and partial 
market coverage, intuition suggests that in a — 1/2 the monopolist is not 
worse off than in any other location. We shall now first show this under 
partial market coverage. 
3. Partial Market Coverage 
Let us now assume that the relative size of s and t is such that if there 
exists a single store, the market is being only partially served. The monopo-
list's objective function is then defined as follows: 
max nM = (s - tx2) 2x, Vx 6 [0, a] (10) 
X 
i.e., the maximum problem faced by the monopolist consists in choosing the 
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marginal consumer, living at distance x from the store, so as to maximize 
profits. The first order condition w.r.t. x is 
— = 2s - 6tx2 = 0 (11) 
yielding x = *J-L as a solution. Provided that x e [0, l/2[, this implies 
3 9 
J < -t2. The equilibrium price is p = - s, while profit amounts to 
U M ~ 3 l T t ' S Ì n C e t l i e m a r g i n a i consumer lives at x = j j ~ away 
from the store, a is not necessarily being set equal to 1/2, and we can 
formulate the monopolist's optimal price-and-location rule as follows: "if 
s e ] 0, J t l choose x = s j j - and p == | then, set 
a e 
37 
Provided that some consumers are not served, the monopolist has an 
incentive towards product (or store) proliferation. Assume she sets up a 
second store. As long as s is so low that the monopolist can behave as if the 
two stores were operating in different markets, i.e., if y< — t and 
16 
x < 1/4, we simply observe a replication of the problem above, leading to 
analogous conclusions. The case in which two stores are sufficient for the 
market to be completely served is tackled in the next section. 
4. Full Market Coverage 
If s > J t, all consumers are served by a single store and the 
monopolist's objective is 
tM _ max n  = s - tx2 V x e [1 - a, 1] (12) 
2 This is written as a strict inequality, since the market is not covered by assumption See 
Section 4. 
A NOTE ON SPATIAL MONOPOLY 521 
The first derivative of (12) w.r.t. x is always negative over the relevant 
interval. This happens because the quantity-effect dries up, while the 
price-effect is negative. This entails that it is efficient to set a = x = 1/2, 
while the equilibrium values of price and profits coincide, being p — nM — 
s - t/4. The optional price-and-location rule for the single store monopolist 
3 1 / >, is now "if s > - /, choose x = - and p = s ; then, set a = x". 
4 2 4 
Otherwise, if s e A , I 
16 4 
the monopolist can serve all consumers 
by opening a second store. The maximum problem leads to a replication of 
what we have just been through, so that the optimal locations are in 1/4 
and 3/4 and x = 1/4 3. 
5. Conclusions 
We tried to describe the optimal behaviour of a monopolist operating 
in a horizontally differentiated market. The outcome seems to be well 
summarized by the rule do not differentiate, unless the market can only be 
covered with more than one store (or product). Furthermore, the optimal 
location, as well as the optimal pricing rule, depends on the relative size of 
the parameters defining consumer surplus and «asportation cost. The 
incentive to differentiate arises when the former is sufficiently lower than 
the latter. 
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NOTA SUL MONOPOLIO SPAZIALE 
Lo scopo di questa breve nota è quello di analizzare il comportamento di un 
monopolista operante in un mercato per prodotti differenziati orizzontalmente. 
Se il surplus lordo unitario di ciascun consumatore è abbastanza alto da far sì che 
il mercato sia completamente servito da un unico punto di vendita, il monopoli-
sta è indifferente tra differenziare oppure no. Altrimenti, la scelta del numero di 
prodotti così come la loro collocazione spaziale e il loro prezzo dipendono dalla 
dimensione relativa del surplus lordo e del costo di trasporto. 
RECENSIONI 
TOTOLA VACCARI M . G . : La dimensione entropica dello sviluppo economico, 1 9 9 4 , 
Padova, Cedam, pp. V-161, L. 20.000. 
Il volume di Maria Grazia Totola Vaccari è il risultato di una fertile ricerca che l'autrice 
sta svolgendo da diversi anni nel campo dell'economia ambientale e delle conseguenti implicazio-
ni con lo sviluppo economico. 
La crisi del rapporto uomo-ambiente nel popperiano « mondo 3 », il mondo della cultura e 
dei prodotti della mente umana (p. 33), ben delineata nel primo Capitolo, richiede un 
consapevole mutamento nella nostra visione dei problemi dello sviluppo economico. Si impone 
il passaggio da un approccio riduttivista e positivista, che ancora caratterizza la teoria economi-
ca dominante, ad una concezione più sistemica, « olista » e meno meccanicistica. Totola Vaccari, 
nello svolgimento del saggio, rimane fedele a questo faticoso proponimento metodologico, 
enunciato nel secondo capitolo, offrendoci una visione rigorosa e, nello stesso tempo, realmente 
interdisciplinare (economica, ecologica, politica, etica e biologica), dei legami tra sviluppo 
economico e crisi ambientale, dimostrando che non sempre « ogni buon economista debba 
essere sufficientemente acuto per comprendere le astratte ramificazioni della teoria neoclassica e 
sufficientemente ottuso per prestarvi fede» (Kay N.M., The Emergent Firm: Knowledge, 
Ignorance and Surprise in Economic Organisation, Macmillan, Londra, 1984, p. 188, cit. in 
Hodgson G., Economia e istituzioni, Otium Edizioni, Ancona, 1991). 
Dopo aver definito il significato fisico dell'entropia (capitolo terzo), l'autrice ripercorre 
criticamente, con una sintesi efficace, l'utilizzo di questa categoria all'interno dell'analisi econo-
mica. Partendo dal contributo fondamentale di Georgescu-Roegen e di Boulding, ci introduce al 
dibattito sviluppatosi in letteratura negli anni '70 e '80 tra gli studiosi che hanno accolto la 
concezione del processo economico di Georgescu-Roegen, e ne hanno tratto le debite conseguen-
ze in tema di sviluppo economico, quali Commoner, Daly, Schumacher, Perrings, e la nutrita 
schiera di coloro che, invece, hanno difeso l'impostazione teorica tradizionale, come Solow, Kay, 
Mirrlees, Herfindahl, Kneese e Rosenberg. 
Da questa rassegna, emerge chiaramente come gli economisti impegnati nello studio dei 
problemi ambientali possano trovare preziosi suggerimenti negli scritti dei pensatori del passato. 
Il riferimento al pensiero fisiocratico, in molte pagine della moderna bioeconomia, è a tutti 
noto. La riscoperta dell'agricoltura, come cqnvertitore energetico, è un'eredità importante di 
quella scuola di pensiero. Anche nell'ultima generazione di esperti ambientali, si riscontra 
questo ritorno alle intuizioni di economisti del passato per andare oltre la razionalità della 
teoria economica moderna. 
Daly, uno degli autori più interessanti sul cui contributo l'autrice si sofferma nell'ultima 
parte del saggio, integra brillantemente nell'analisi milliana (della quale accoglie la preferenza 
per lo stato stazionario per motivi di ordine essenzialmente etico) la concezione del nostro 
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pianeta come un sistema termodinamico chiuso. Un aspetto stimolante nell'opera di Daly, 
sviluppato nel volume Steady-State Economics del 1991 e in altri scritti precedenti, è la 
revisione del concetto di efficienza in un'economia stazionaria, considerando l'azione delle leggi 
della termodinamica. Tale autore, proprio come J.S. Mill, è convinto che sia necessario per 
l'umanità giungere allo stato stazionario prima che questo le sia imposto. Nelle parole di Daly 
la stazionarietà dello sviluppo « non implica un throughput, costante, né una tecnologia conge-
lata, né tanto meno assicura una vita eterna al sistema economico », ma rappresenta piuttosto 
una strategia saggia per il nostro pianeta, che « gli permetta di morire di vecchiaia e non di 
cancro generato da mania della crescita » (p. 123). Ciò sarà possibile unicamente sollecitando 
una crescita morale degli individui al fine di renderli più responsabili (Jonas). L'uomo dovrà 
sempre più riconoscersi come « cittadino biotico », gravato di una responsabilità che si estende 
alle diverse componenti del sistema che sono state per tradizione trascurate perché ritenute 
moralmente « neutre », o « inferiori », sotto il profilo ontologico (p. 14). 
L'altro tratto caratteristico della moderna economia ambientale è, infatti, la riscoperta della 
dimensione etica nel discorso economico e la consapevolezza, di stampo malthusiano, « che vi 
sono problemi di economia politica con soluzione unicamente morale e non tecnica » (p. 55). 
Non è un caso, a nostro avviso, che una delle più significative opere di Daly, For the Common 
Good, sia stata scritta assieme a un teologo, Cobb, con cui Daly condivide anche la paternità 
nell'elaborazione AAI'indice del benessere economico sostenibile, comprendente consumo medio, 
distribuzione e degrado ambientale. Tale strumento si dimostra molto utile per approssimare, in 
termini quantitativi, lo scarto sempre più grande fra crescita del PIL e crescita del benessere 
individuale. Per una divertente descrizione di un mondo immaginario, affetto da « feticismo 
della crescita », rinviamo al pamphlet di Ruffolo, Lo sviluppo dei limiti. Dove si tratta della 
crescita insensata, Laterza, Bari, 1994. 
Le considerazioni, con le quali Totola Vaccari conclude il saggio, sono, a ragione, 
abbastanza pessimiste. L'obiettivo di una società sostenibile, che induca lo sviluppo economico 
verso un sentiero « che tende alla stazionarietà e ad una più equa distribuzione diacronica e 
sincronica delle risorse » (p. 143) non è stata finora accolta nell'agenda dei policy-makers. Anche 
nell'ultima Conferenza delle Nazioni Unite sull'ambiente e lo sviluppo, tenuta a Rio de Janeiro 
nel giugno 1992, sono mancate decisioni concrete e, soprattutto, con scadenze precise. È 
emersa, finalmente, a parere dell'autrice, un'attenzione mondiale sui temi ambientali; per la 
prima volta si è affrontato, in un unico contesto, il nesso tra degrazione ecologica e degrado 
sociale, il problema Nord-Sud e il nodo della giustizia sociale. Sono state firmate due 
importanti convenzioni: sulla biodiversità e sul clima. 
Tuttavia l'incertezza del quadro politico internazionale non fa riporre molte speranze per il 
futuro. In questi periodi, è necessario che l'elaborazione culturale « non segni il passo » e 
vengano sviluppate nuove saggezze e approntati adeguati strumenti conoscitivi, in quello spazio 
di confine all'intersezione tra i saperi « consolidati ». È questo, ci sembra, il significato più 
profondo del testo in esame, poiché riprendendo il titolo della celebre autobiografia intellettuale 
di Popper, « la ricerca non ha fine ». 
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S I N T E S I D E L L 
GENI 
L'ASSICURATORE 
L'attività del Gruppo. Il Gruppo Generali continua la politica 
di rafforzamento internazionale e di razionalizzazione delle 
strutture presenti nei diversi mercati. Con quest'ultimo obiet-
tivo, nel 1994 è stata ridisegnata l'organizzazione operante in 
Germania ed è stato varato un progetto di profonda ristruttura-
zione delle partecipazioni detenute in Spagna tramite la 
Holding Central Hispano-Generali, di cui il Gruppo ha acquisito 
il possesso totale. Oggetto di importanti interventi di ristruttu-
razione e di rafforzamento è stata anche la presenza nell'area i 
latinoamericana: in Argentina, con la costituzione tra l'altro di 
tre nuove società nel settore dei fondi pensione, in Perù e 
Colombia attraverso l'integrazione di nuove entità con le pree-
sistenti strutture. In Italia sono state apportate allaAlleanza di 
Milano quattro società che hanno concorso a potenziare la sua 
ATTIVO (in milioni di lire) 
Beni immobili 
Titoli a reddito fisso 
Azioni e partecipazioni 
Prestiti 
Depositi di riassicurazione 
Depositi bancari 
Debitori diversi e altri attivi 
Totale attivo 
PASSIVO (in milioni di lire) 
Accantonamenti 
per Impegni assicurativi 
Depositi di riassicurazione 
Altri passivi 
Ouote di terzi 
Patrimonio netto 
Utile del l 'eserc iz io 
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• Sono state consolidate 93 compagnie di assicurazione operanti in 
una quarantina di mercati, 35 finanziarie, 22 immobiliari e 3 agricole. 
• L'utile complessivo dell'esercizio è stato di 873,4 miliardi, a fron-
te di 686,1 miliardi dell'anno precedente. La quota dell'utile con-
solidato di pertinenza della Capogruppo è di 640,9 miliardi contro 
i 610,1 miliardi dell'esercizio precedente. 
rete distributiva e l'offerta di prodotti finanziari e assicurativi 
vita; è stata inoltre accentuata la specializzazione geografica, 
settoriale e distributiva delle compagnie danni. Due nuove con-
trollate sono state costituite in Lussemburgo e nella Repubblica 
Ceca. La principale operazione di acquisizione ha riguardato la 
partecipazione di controllo nella Fortuna, una holding di Zurigo 
cui fanno capo cinque compagnie di assicurazione, grazie alla 
quale viene considerevolmente migliorata - sia in termini di co-
pertura del territorio che di gamma di prodotti - la presenza 
sul mercato elvetico. 
Nel giugno 1995 è stata infine messa a punto una complessa o-
perazione che ha dato avvio alla riorganizzazione del Gruppo 
in Francia e all'acquisizione di due compagnie, la France Vie e 
la France IARD. 
• i premi lordi hanno raggiunto 
28.736.2 miliardi (+15,5%) di cui 
12.593,7 nel ramo vita (+26,1%) e 
16.142,5 nei rami danni (+8,4%). 
Essi provengono per il 75,6% da 
Paesi dell'Unione Europea (Italia 
29,6%) per il 17,7% dagli altri Paesi 
europei e per il restante 6,7% dai 
Paesi extraeuropei. 
• Per prestazioni assicurative sono 
stati effettuati pagamenti per 
14.674,1 miliardi. 
• Gli accantonamenti per impegni 
assicurativi sono aumentati di 
10.162.3 miliardi. 
« I costi di produzione e ammini-
strazione hanno inciso per 6.618,2 
miliardi (+10,2%). 
• Il totale degli investimenti è di 
92.495,7 miliardi a fronte dei quali vi sono accantonamenti per 
impegni assicurativi per 82.851,2 miliardi. 
• I redditi degli investimenti sono risultati di 6.920,4 miliardi 
(+9,4%). 
• La valutazione del portafoglio titoli ai corsi di borsa di fine anno 
ha fatto emergere minusvalenze di registro per 660,7 miliardi, che 
sono state spesate nel conto economico. 
• Il patrimonio netto complessivo risulta di 11.298,5 miliardi, di 
cui 8.977,3 miliardi di pertinenza della Capogruppo. 
Il Gruppo Generali, oltre che in Italia, opera in Argentina, 
Austria, Belgio, Bras i le , Canada, Colombia, Danimarca, 
Ecuador, Emirati Arabi, Francia , Germania, Giappone, 
Gibilterra, Gran Bretagna, Grecia, Guatemala , Guernsey, 
Hong Kong, Irlanda, Israele, Libano, Lussemburgo, Malta, 
Messico, Olanda, Panama, Perù, Portogallo, Principato di 
Monaco, Repubblica Ceca, Romania, San Marino, Singapore, 
Spagna, Stati Uniti, Sud Africa, Svizzera, Turchia, Ungheria. 
S E R C I Z I O 1 9 9 4 
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L'attività della Capogruppo. L'impegno primario della Compa-
gnia è rivolto al consolidamento del riequilibrio dei risultati in-
dustriali, con il duplice obiettivo di una costante e ordinata cre-
scita della redditività complessiva e del rafforzamento patrimo-
niale. L'esercizio 1994 è stato caratterizzato da un andamento 
positivo, determinato dal forte miglioramento del risultato della 
gestione strettamente assicurativa: in quest'ambito il lavoro di-
retto italiano dei rami danni - che in passato aveva prodotto 
perdite molto pesanti - è stato nuovamente ricondotto all'equi-
librio, grazie alla concomitante riduzione della sinistralità e 
dell'incidenza dei costi; anche il lavoro estero e l'indiretto han-
no evidenziato significativi e diffusi miglioramenti. Il più favo-
revole andamento della gestione industriale ha influito positi-
vamente sul risultato della gestione ordinaria che ha evidenzia-
(in milioni di lire) 1994 1993 
Premi lordi 10.251.002 9.776.397 
Premi ceduti - 950.445 -1 .224.888 
Premi netti 9.300.557 8.551.509 
Redditi netti degli investimenti 2.509.804 2.481.619 
Interessi tecnici gestione vita -1 .509.726 -1 .498 .016 
Risultato della gestione tecnica - 420.924 - 682.407 
Proventi e oneri vari - 111.575 - 127.715 
Saldo del la gestione ordinaria 4 6 7 . 5 7 9 173.481 
Profitti da alienazione di titoli ed immobili 260.224 512.713 
Utili di cambio 179.729 208.977 
Minusvalenze da valutazione di titoli - 254.648 - 185.384 
Imposte indirette non ricorrenti 
e imposte pagate all'estero - 14.539 - 135.571 
Saldo della gestione straordinaria 170.766 4 0 0 . 7 3 5 
Imposte sul reddito dell'esercizio - 197.446 - 153.846 
Utile del l 'eserciz io 4 4 0 . 8 9 9 4 2 0 . 3 7 0 
• L'utile netto d'esercizio è di 440,9 miliardi, contro 420,4'miliardi 
dell'esercizio precedente. 
• I premi lordi hanno raggiunto i 10.251 miliardi (+4,9%), di cui 
4.200,9 miliardi nel ramo vita e 6.050,1 miliardi nei rami danni. 
to un utile notevolmente più elevato di quello dell'esercizio 
1993, malgrado la stasi dei redditi degli investimenti, determi-
nata dall'andamento dei tassi di interesse sui mercati mondiali. 
La gestione straordinaria ha registrato nel 1994 una flessione 
dei profitti realizzati da alienazioni di titoli e immobili, sia a se-
guito del minor apporto derivante da operazioni di carattere ec-
cezionale sia in funzione dell'evoluzione dei mercati mobiliari 
che ha condizionato l'attività di trading. Il conto economico ha 
da un lato registrato minusvalenze di registro sul portafoglio ti-
toli per 256,9 miliardi e dall'altro ha beneficiato di un saldo po-
sitivo di 174,8 miliardi delle variazioni delle parità di cambio, 
tenuto conto dell'elevata incidenza delle attività estere. L'utile 
netto di bilancio, dopo il pagamento di imposte per quasi 200 
miliardi, è salito da 420,4 a 440,9 miliardi. 
• Per prestazioni assicurative sono 
stati effettuati pagamenti per 
5.285.6 miliardi. 
• Gli accantonamenti per impegni 
assicurativi sono aumentati di 
3.844.7 miliardi. 
• I costi di produzione e di ammini-
strazione hanno inciso per 2.313,5 
miliardi. L'incidenza dei costi sui 
premi è diminuita nel lavoro diretto 
italiano dal 23% del 1993 al 22,4%. 
• Gli investimenti ammontano a • 
34.211,3 miliardi (+11,5%) a fronte 
dei quali vi sono impegni assicurati-
vi per 27.978,9 miliardi. 
• I redditi degli investimenti sono 
stati pari a 2.509,8 miliardi (+2,5% a 
termini omogenei). 
» Il patrimonio netto raggiunge i 6.708,9 miliardi con un incre-
mento di 141,1 miliardi. L'eccedenza rispetto al fabbisogno mini-
mo del margine di solvibilità è di 2.136,3 miliardi nel ramo vita e di 
2.261.8 miliardi nei rami danni. 
• Il dividendo - al lordo delle ritenute di legge - è di 360 lire per 
azione (+10% a termini omogenei) ed è pagabile dal 17 luglio. 
• Il Consiglio di Amministrazione, riunitosi a conclusione dei 
lavori assembleari, ha nominato Presidente Antoine Bernheim, 
Vicepresidenti Francesco Cingano e Gianfranco Gutty, Ammini-
stratore Delegato Gianfranco Gutty. 
Compagnie del Gruppo Generali in Italia: AdriaVita, Agricol-
tura, Alleanza, AssiBa, Aurora, La Carnica, La Venezia, Na-
vale, SIAD, Trieste e Venezia, Risparmio Assicurazioni, Ri-
sparmio Vita, UMS General i Marine , Europ As s i s t ance . 
Gltll'I'O 
GENERALI L'ASSICURATORE SENZA FRONTIERE. 
ALLEANZA ASSICURAZIONI 
S o c i e t à pe r A z i o n i con S e d e e D i r e z i o n e G e n e r a l e in M i l a n o - V i a l e L. S t u r z o , 35 
Capitale Sociale L. 330.135.513.000 interamente versato - Registro Imprese Milano N° 60220 
BILANCIO 1994 
ENTRATE (miliardi di lire) 
Premi e accessori 2.365,5 
Premi ceduti in riassicurazione (-) 927,0 
Redditi ordinari e profitti da alienazione 1.271,9 
Saldo prelievi - accantonamenti 67,8 
Altre partite tecniche 31,0 
Altri proventi 101,3 
TOTALE 2.910,5 
USCITE 
Sinistri, scadenze, riscatti 293,8* 
Incrementi riserve tecniche 1.135,3 * 
Redditi verso riassicuratori 337,9 
Costi di produzione e amministrazione 215,0* 
Minusvalenze da titoli 453,0 
Altri oneri 127,8 
Imposte e tasse 165,3 
Utile dell'esercizio 182,4 
TOTALE 2.910,5 
* al netto quote cedute ai riassicuratori 
ANDAMENTO DEI PREMI 
in Miliardi 
2 . 5 0 0 
2.365,5 
2.000 




90 91 92 
PARTE ORDINARIA 
• I premi ed accessori sono ammontati a 2.365,5 
miliardi (1.970,7 miliardi nel 1993), con un incremento 
pari al 20%. Sono stati ceduti in riassicurazione 927 
miliardi, pari al 39,2%. 
• La produzione netta in capitali è stata di 9.400 
miliardi (8.562), con un aumento del 9,8%, mentre 
i premi annui di nuova produzione sono ammontati 
a 582 miliardi (485), con un incremento del 20%. 
• I redditi e profitti da alienazione sono ammontati a 
1.271,9 miliardi (1.292,9) e sono stati destinati per 
il 27% al servizio riassicurazione, per il 33% alle 
riserve tecniche e per- il 40% a favore del conto 
economico. Rendimento Fondo S. Giorgio: 11,65%, 
retrocessione agli Assicurati 80%. 
a Gli investimenti ammontano a 11.376 miliardi (9.680 
nel 1993), ripartiti come segue: obbligazioni 58,8%, 
immobili 18%, partecipazioni 13,1%, altri 10,1%. 
Il rendimento medio è del 9,4%. 
• I sinistri, le scadenze e i riscatti sono stati di 606 
miliardi, di cui 293,8 a carico della Società e 312,2 
a carico dei riassicuratori. 
• È stato completato il progetto imprenditoriale appro-
vato nel 1993 con l'acquisizione del residuo 49% 
del capitale de' La Venezia S.p.A. e Fincral S.p.A. 
n L'utile è stato di L. 182,4 miliardi. È stato deciso un 
dividendo unitario invariato di L. 135 sulle azioni 
ordinarie e di L. 160 sulle azioni di risparmio n.c., 
pagabili dal 18 luglio 1995. 
La Riserva Patrimoniale è stata rafforzata di 67 
miliardi, raggiungendo 463,4 miliardi. 
L'utile per azione (ordinarie e di risparmio n.c.) è di 
L. 277,8 e il rapporto dividendo/utile è del 50%. 
• Cariche Sociali: Presidente Amm. Del. A. Desiata, 
Vice Pres. E. Coppola Di Canzano. 
Amministratori: G. Bazoli, E. Braggiotti, G. Buoro, 
M. Casella, O. Castellino, E. Dusi, G. Gutty, P. Iona, 
G. Liveris, A. Minucci, A. Wormser. 
Collegio Sindacale: Pres. F. Viezzoli. 
Membri effettivi: G. Spizzico, G. Terrin. 
Membri supplenti: G. Dassi, N. Dolfin. 
a II Bilancio Consolidato ha chiuso l'esercizio 1994 
con premi lordi per 2.542,7 miliardi (+ 29,5%), 
investimenti per 11.852,9 (+ 22,1 %) e un saldo utile 
di 140,6 miliardi. 
ALLEANZA 
A S S I C U R A Z I O N I 
assicura e semplifica la vita 
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Parlatene subi to con ¡ Promotor i Finanziari 
GenerComit Distribuzione SIM, oppure chiedete 
informazioni agli sportelli della Banca Commerciale 
Italiana, del Banco di Chiavari e della Riviera Ligure 
e della Banca di Legnano. 
Aff idatevi alla professionalità di GenerComit 
Gestione, la società di fond i di Invest imento di 
del Pacifico. 
GENERCOMIT ESPANSIONE un fondo bilancia-
to, caratterizzato da prevalente Interesse per t i tol i 
di emit tent i esteri con una particolare attenzione 
al Paesi cosiddett i emergent i dell 'America Latina, 






I ® GENERALI 
(iEnkrxijj Assicurazioni Generali S .pA 
due grandi partners: La Banca Commerciale Italiana 
e le Assicurazioni Generali. 
O GenerComit 
Con l'obiettivo di dare valore al risparmk 
Avver tenze. Pr ima del l 'adesione, leggere ¡I p r o s p e t t o i n f o r m a t i v o che il p r o p o n e n t e l ' I n v e s t i m e n t o deve c o n s e g n a r e . 
Studi economici e social i 
Rivis ta di vita economica - Centro Studi " G . T o n i o l o " 
Anno X X X Gennaio - Marzo 1995 Fase. I 
S O M M A R I O 
EDITORIALE: R. Molesti: I trent'anni della rivista Studi economici e sociali 
ARTICOLI: A. Fazio: L'opera di Guido Carli - A. Brancaccio: Come ammodernare 
l'apparato statale - R. Molesti. Cristianesimo e profitto - L. Lesaffre: Gli affari e il 
Vangelo - M. Andreazza: Stato e democrazia nel pensiero di Giuseppe Toniolo - G. 
Motzo: Le attribuzioni del Ministro per le Riforme Istituzionali - J. Ruffìer e D. 
Villavicencio: Solidarietà locali: un bene nascosto - S. Gambaro: Il mercato dei buoni 
ordinari del Tesoro: un'analisi econometrica 
NOTE E RASSEGNE: A. Cremonesi: Gli enti conferenti tra il pubblico e il privato: contributi 
e proposte - S. Trucco: Tra economia e storia: pubblicato un volume di "Studi in memoria 
di Gino Barbieri" - V. Campetti: Rinasce la prestigiosa rivista Nuova economia e storia 
Direzione, Redazione e Amministrazione 
Studi Economici e Sociali, Piazza G. Toniolo, 2 - Pisa 
Il Pensiero Economico Moderno 
Anno X V Gennaio - Giugno 1995 N. 1-2 
S O M M A R I O 
ARTICOLI: A. Fazio: La finanza pubblica in Italia - R. Zangheri: Fra cronaca e 
storia: il primo movimento socialista italiano in alcuni giudizi contemporanei - G. 
Ratti: La privatizzazione delle aziende pubbliche locali - L. Fornaciari Davoli: 
Università e imprese nell'attuale fase di evoluzione - V. Saba: Storia e politica del 
lavoro - P. Pasture e E. Lamberts: Il sindacalismo cristiano in Europa: passato, 
presente e prospettive future - R. Orsini: L'economia posizionale: limiti e forme 
della crescita 
OSSERVATORIO: V. Campetti: Rinasce la prestigiosa rivista "Nuova economìa e 
storia" - S. Trucco: Un volume di "Studi in memoria dì Gino Barbieri" 
Direzione, Redazione e Amministrazione 
Il Pensiero Economico Moderno, Via della Fortezza, 1 - Pisa 
Ed è senza spese di conto! 
Conto Benefit. 
Il benessere del vostro denaro, in un conto corrente unico. 
¡Ss™ 
A conti fatti 
s^moio 
ISTITUTO BANCARIO SAN I5VOIO M TORINO SPA 






arriva qui al tuo numero, 
riparte e 
arriva dove vuoi tu. 
Lrasferimento 
di chiamata. 
'a oggi le telefonate di casa 
o di ufficio, le porti dove vuoi tu. 
Per non perdere 
neanche una chiamata. 
Pensa infatti alia comodità 
di andare a casa di amici, 
passare una giornata al circolo 
o magari metterti in viaggio, 
sapendo che la telefonata 
importante, di lavoro o di famiglia, 
che aspetti in ufficio o a casa, 
verrà automaticamente deviata 
presso il numero che 
decidi tu: la casa di amici, 
il circolo o il telefonino. 
Senza mai dover dare 
questi numeri a nessuno. 
Per installare il Trasferimento di 
chiamata, chiama il 187. 
Avrai modalità e costi del servizio. 
trasferimento di chiamata. 
Porta il tuo telefono dove vuoi tu. 
! (Ovviamente, è troppo piccolo e troppo leggero per essere 
un notebook serio) 
1a Posizione 
3" Posizione 3" Posizione 
IBM presenta ThinkPad 701C. 
Aprendosi rivela lo schermo 10.4" a colori e a matrice attiv 
Processori disponibili fino a 486DX4 a 75MHz. 
(Ovviamente, i consueti limiti dei notebook sono stati superai 
2" Posizione 
2" Posizione 
Un meccanismo nascosto porta la maxi tastiera 
in posizione di lavoro. 
(Ovviamente, le apparenze ingannano) 
il Prototipo il Prodotto 
1994 IBM SEMEA 
a Numero Verde 
Per saperne di più contattate il Concessionario r "|g7-0"] 8 0 0 1 
o Rivenditore IBM più vicino o chiamate il » La differenza c'è 
L'Archìvio .Sturico haigas con la sua raccolta di libri 
antichi, documenti ed apparecchiature, rappresentala 
memoria storica della Società Italiana per il Gas, fondata 
nel 1837, e della Società Azionaria per la Condotta di 
Acque Potabili, costituita nel 1852. 
L'opera di sistemazione e conservazione del rilevante 
patrimonio documentale, che rinnova il costante impegno 
del Gruppo Italgas a sostegno della cultura e della 
scienza, è stata condotta in stretta collaborazione con 
la Sovrintendenza Archivistica per il Piemonte e la 
Valle d'Aosta, la quale ha classificato l'Archivio tra 
quelli "di rilevante valore storico". 
Accanto agli atti ufficiali e legali, libri sociali, documenti 
amministrativi, organizzativi e operativi, è conservata 
la documentazione di natura tecnica e tecnologica. 
Dell'Archivio Storico Italgas fa parte anche la ricca 
Biblioteca Storica nella quale circa cinquemila volumi 
ripercorrono la storia e l'evoluzione dell'industria del gas 
dai primi esperimenti del Settecento fino ai giorni nostri. 
Società Italiana per il Gas p.A. 
Via XX Settembre, 41 
10121 Torino 
Archivio Storico Italgas 
Via Po, 51 
10121 Torino 
ÎICILCASSA. BASI SOLIDE PER PUNTARE IN ALTO 
ONDATA NEL 1861 - PRESIDENZA E DIREZIONE GENERALE IN PALERMO -245 DIPENDENZE IN SICILIA - AGENZIE 
N ROMA E MILANO - UFFICI DI RAPPRESENTANZA IN FRANCOFORTE SUL MENO E NEW YORK - ADERENTE A 
ONDO INTERBANCARIO DI TUTELA DEI DEPOSITI - CORRISPONDENTI SU TUTTE LE PIAZZE BANCARIE D'ITALIA E SULL 
RINCIPALI PIAZZE ESTERE - TUTTI I SERVIZI E LE OPERAZIONI DI BANCA - CREDITO FONDIARIO E ALLE OPERE PUBBLICH 
AVANTI TUTTA. 
Non si effettuano soste. 
A Fiera Milano gli appuntamenti si susseguono 
con la regolarità e il successo di sempre. 
Oltre 70 esposizioni, 1,500.000mq di stand 
venduti ogni anno, 35.000 espositori, 
2 .600.000 visitatori e contemporaneamente 
i lavori in corso per i nuovi padiglioni 
e per rendere più funzionali quelli esistenti. 
Per accorgersene, basta alzare gli occhi. 
Il Duemila è già in arrivo. 
Il cuore grande di Milano. 
FIERA MILANO - Largo Domodossola, 1 - 20145 Milano 
Tel. 02/4997.1 - Fax 02/4997.7174 -Telex 331360-332221 EAFM I 
E D I Z I O N I C E D A M - P A D O V A 
Recentissima: 
CARLO FILIPPO FRATESCHI - GIOVANNI SALVINI 
S I S T E M I E C O N O M I C I C O M P A R A T I 
pp. X I V - 3 1 4 
ISBN 88-13-19171-5 L. 35.000 
INDICE. - Presentazione. - I: Problemi di metodo e di contenuto. - II : Sistemi economici: 
caratteristiche di base e classificazione. - III: Criteri di valutazione e confronto dei sistemi 
economici. - IV: I sistemi capitalisti. - V: I sistemi socialisti. 
IN VENDITA NELLE MIGLIORI LIBRERIE E PRESSO I NOSTRI AGENTI 
